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I. INTRODUCTION

November 11, 1982. Three members of the Irish Republican Army
(IRA)--Gervaise McKerr, Eugene Toman, and Sean Bums-are traveling
together in a car on the Tullygally Road in rural County Armagh.' It is
nighttime, and the road is damp with rain.2 The three men are unarmed.3
They are unaware that they are approaching a roadblock manned by
members of the Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU), a
counterinsurgency detachment of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
Special Branch.4
The roadblock's sole purpose is to stop the car driven by McKerr.5
Two weeks earlier, three police officers were killed when an IRA bomb
planted in a culvert exploded at Kinnego Embankment, ripping through
their armored car.6 The Special Branch suspects that Toman and Bums
were involved in planning the Kinnego operation and has been following
their movements.

1. McKerr v. United Kingdom, 2001-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 475, 485 [hereinafter
McKerr].
2. Id. 19 (quoting extensively from the unreported Northern Ireland Court of
Appeals decision by Lord Justice Gibson).
3. Id. 11.
4.

See id.

11. See also PETER TAYLOR, BRITS: THE WAR AGAINST THE IRA 241-

53 (2001) (describing the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the HMSU in
Northern Ireland in 1982, including the Tullygally Road incident).
5. McKerr, supra note 1, 19.
6.

See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 247-50.

7.

McKerr, supra note 1,

14.

[VOL. 9: 81, 2007]

Seeking the Final Court of Justice
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

When the car carrying McKerr, Toman, and Bums reaches the checkpoint,
the HMSU detachment opens fire, discharging 109 bullets.8 The vehicle's
three occupants are killed.
Over the course of the next month, the members of the HMSU
responsible for killing McKerr, Toman, and Bums will take part in two
similar operations resulting in the deaths of three additional, unarmed
individuals. Two of the victims, Searnus Grew and Roddy Carroll, are active
members of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a paramilitary
splinter group. 9 The third, Michael0 Tighe, is a seventeen year-old civilian
with no paramilitary connections.'
In 1984, three of the members of the HMSU responsible for the deaths
of McKerr, Toman, and Bums were brought to trial for their role in the
events at Tullygally Road two years earlier. Lord Justice Gibson of the
Northern Ireland Court of Appeals, sitting without a jury, found all three
not guilty of murder, concluding that "there never was the slimmest
chance that the Crown could have hoped to secure a conviction."'" He
added:
I want to make clear that having heard the entire Crown case exposed in open
court I regard each of the accused as absolutely blameless in this matter.
I consider that in fairness to them that finding also ought to be recorded
together with my commendation for their courage and determination in bringing
12
the three deceased men to justice, in this case to the final court ofjustice.

Lord Justice Gibson's controversial commendation was not, as it turns
out, the final legal word on the events at Tullygally Road. On May 4,
2001, the McKerr incident was at the center of one in a series of four
joined decisions (known collectively as the Jordan et al. decisions)
handed down by the European Court of Human Rights (the "European
Court" or "Court"). 13 In these cases, the Court held that the United

8.
9.

Id. 11.
See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 244-46

10. Seeid. at250.
11. McKerr, supra note 1, 19.
12. Id. 20.
13. McKerr, supra note 1. Relevant excerpts of the other three cases are available
in the appendix to McKerr, 2001-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 537, and are also available in full on
the European Court's website. European Court of Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.
int/echr/ (select "case-law" hyperlink; then follow "HUDOC" hyperlink; then enter
applicant number for the following cases and click "Search"). Jordan v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 24746/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 4, 2001) [hereinafter Jordan]; Kelly and Others
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30054/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 4, 2001) [hereinafter Kelly

Kingdom had violated the "right to life" enshrined in Article 2 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the "European Convention") 14 by failing to
conduct effective official investigations into the incidents at issue in
order to determine the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by state
agents.
The Jordan et al. decisions represent a landmark expansion of the
procedural component of the right to life that the European Court has
been developing since the mid-1990s. Although in previous cases the
Court had found a violation of Article 2 based on the state's failure to
properly investigate the use of lethal force by its agents, in the Jordan et
al. decisions the Court fleshed out the meaning of this procedural
requirement by holding that such investigations must meet specific and
exacting standards of independence, effectiveness, promptness, and
transparency. The Court reinforced its holdings in the Jordan et al.
decisions in two other cases concerning the British state's use of lethal
force in Northern Ireland: McShane v. United Kingdom and Finucane v.
UnitedKingdom. 5
The Jordan et al. decisions also add an important dimension to the
debate over accountability for state violence during the conflict in Northern
Ireland. The deaths that prompted the European Court's decisions are
illustrative of broader patterns in the use of lethal force by the British state
during the roughly thirty years of conflict in Northern Ireland known as
"the Troubles." Since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in
1998,16 Northern Ireland has been involved in a difficult and fragile
peace process. The question of how to deal with past human rights
violations plays a major role in Northern Ireland's ongoing political
transition. In particular, deaths resulting from state violence constitute a
significant and highly emotive category of the nearly 3,700 deaths that
occurred during the conflict. The issue of how to achieve accountability
for these deaths within the broader framework of a peace process aimed
at political compromise and societal reconciliation is of particular
and Others]; Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 37715/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 4,
2001) [hereinafter Shanaghan].
14. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. For the full
text of Article 2, see infra Part II.A.
15. McShane v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43290/98, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 593 (2002)
[hereinafter McShane]; Finucane v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29178/95, 2003-VIII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Finucane]. This article will use the term "Jordanet
al." to refer to all six cases from Northern Ireland in which the European Court found a
procedural violation of Article 2 based on the United Kingdom's failure to conduct
effective official investigations into lethal force deaths.
16. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, U.K.-Ir., Apr. 10, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 751 [hereinafter Good Friday Agreement].

[VOL. 9: 81, 2007]

Seeking the Final Court ofJustice
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

importance. The Jordan et al. decisions speak directly to the question of
how institutions and state actors in Northern Ireland might operate in the
future in order to ensure that investigations into lethal force deaths
comply with international human rights norms. The decisions also open
up difficult issues regarding the role of state violence during the past
conflict, including the question of how past state violence should be
dealt with in the present.
This article examines the impact of the European Court's right to life
jurisprudence on the issue of accountability for state violence in Northern
Ireland. To date, the initiatives undertaken by the United Kingdom to
comply with the European Court's rulings are largely unsatisfactory.
Piecemeal institutional reforms aimed at preventing future breaches of
Article 2 have failed to fully address the underlying concerns identified
by the Court, and domestic right to life jurisprudence has placed
significant limitations on the extent to which past violations of the right
to life can be dealt with effectively in British courts. The United
Kingdom's response therefore calls into question both the government's
commitment to honoring the Jordan et al. decisions and the capability of
ordinary domestic criminal law to deal with systematic human rights
abuses of the kind that occurred during the Northern Ireland conflict.
Part II of this article provides historical background on the issue of
state violence in Northern Ireland, focusing on the ways in which the use
of lethal force to combat political dissent and paramilitary violence
created a situation in which protection of the right to life was minimized.
Part III examines the European Court's Article 2 jurisprudence, tracing
the development of the procedural component of the right to life from its
creation in McCann v. United Kingdom through the Jordan et al.
decisions. Part IV discusses the United Kingdom's attempts to comply
with the Jordan et al. decisions through institutional reforms aimed at
specific criticisms identified by the European Court. It also considers
the impact of Britain's domestic right to life jurisprudence on the
meaning and scope of Article 2 in the domestic context. Part V analyzes
the current use of historical investigations and public inquiries aimed at
dealing with lethal force deaths in Northern Ireland. The article argues
that although these mechanisms have been given a certain impetus by
the Jordan et al. decisions, they have also been limited in their
effectiveness by the British government's reluctance to engage in a
robust application of the right to life as defined by the European Court.
Part VI evaluates the current status of the protection of the right to life in

Northern Ireland, paying particular attention to the impact of both
international human rights law and the political imperatives of Northern
Ireland's peace process on the implementation of Jordan et al. The
article concludes by placing the Jordan et al. decisions within the
broader context of recent efforts to reestablish political compromise in
Northern Ireland, and argues that a greater adherence to the right to life
would benefit the peace process.

II. LETHAL FORCE DEATHS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Beginning in the late 1960s, Northern Ireland experienced roughly
three decades of conflict between its Protestant unionist (or loyalist)
majority, which favored maintaining the province's union with Britain,
and Catholic nationalist (or republican) minority, which sought an end to
British rule and the establishment of a united Ireland. 17 Between 1966
and 1999, 3,636 individuals died as a result of political violence. 18 Of
these, 3,189, or nearly 90% of the total, were killed by either republican
or loyalist paramilitary organizations. 19 By contrast, the security forcesthe British Army, Royal Ulster Constabulary, and locally recruited reserve
forces such as the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR)-were responsible
for 367 deaths.20 Yet despite the relatively small number of deaths
directly attributable to the state, the significance of state violence within
the context of the conflict cannot be underestimated. Although the state's
response to the Troubles was in many respects shaped by the nature of
paramilitary violence and civil unrest, the reverse is also true-the
actions of the state in confronting both real and perceived threats had a
profound impact on the contours of the conflict.
Fionnuala Ni Aoldin has identified three major phases in the use of
force by the state during the Troubles: militarization, normalization, and
counterinsurgency. 21 Both the number and type of lethal force deaths
varied within and between these phases as the British state pursued
various strategies aimed at quelling unrest and securing Northern Ireland's
position within the United Kingdom.

17. A full explanation of the historical background to the conflict in Northern
Ireland lies beyond the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive and balanced overview,
see DAVID McKITTRICK & DAVID MCVEA, MAKING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES: THE STORY

OF THE CONFLICT INNORTHERN IRELAND (2002).
18.

DAVID McKjTrRICK ET AL., LOST LIVES: THE STORIES OF THE MEN, WOMEN

AND CHILDREN WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND TROUBLES

(1999).
19.
20.
21.

1476

Id.
Id.
FIONNUALA Ni AOLAiN, THE POLITICS OF FORCE: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND

STATE VIOLENCE INNORTHERN IRELAND 26-71 (2000).
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The militarization phase commenced in 1969 with the deployment of
the British Army into an atmosphere of intense civil unrest and increasing
paramilitary violence. 22 The soldiers quickly proved "demonstrably illequipped for the task in which they were engaged-in effect, a quasipolicing function in mainly urban areas, with poor training and a lack of
local knowledge., 23 Their heavy-handed responses to marches, riots,
and street violence resulted in the deaths of 188 individuals between
1969 and 1974.24
Bloody Sunday, which occurred on January 30, 1972, epitomized state
violence during this period. On that day, British paratroopers shot and
killed thirteen unarmed Catholics during a civil rights march in Derry.
The Widgery Tribunal, convened by the British government in the wake
of Bloody Sunday, absolved the paratroopers of any wrongdoing and
suggested that the demonstrators who were killed had posed a threat to

safety and security. 26 From the outset, the nationalist community rejected
these findings as a whitewash of the incident and further proof of
Britain's unwillingness to uphold the rule of law in Northern Ireland.27
By the mid-1970s, the British government recognized that it faced a
long-term crisis in Northern Ireland, and the failure of the overt military
response to restore order during the early years of the conflict led to a
shift in tactics. The government abandoned the militarization strategy in
favor of normalization: political violence was recast as criminal activity,
and the traditional institutions of law and order (such as the police and
22.

See id. at 29-44.

23.

Id. at 31.

24. Id. at 33.
25. See Angela Hegarty, The Government of Memory: Public Inquiries and the
Limits of Justice in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1148, 1162-65 (2003)

(providing an overview of Bloody Sunday).

A fourteenth individual shot by the

paratroopers on Bloody Sunday died later as the result of his wounds. See id. at 1163.
26.

TRIBUNAL UNDER THE TRIBUNALS OF INQUIRY (EVIDENCE) ACT 1921, INQUIRY

INTO THE EVENTS ON 30 JANUARY 1972 WHICH LED TO Loss OF LIFE IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PROCESSION INLONDONDERRY ON THAT DAY, 1972, H.L. 101, H.C.220.
27. During the 1990s, independent investigations into Bloody Sunday produced
strong evidence that the fourteen dead marchers were unarmed and innocent of any
wrongdoing at the time they were shot. See generally DON MULLAN, BLOODY SUNDAY:
MASSACRE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1997) (providing eyewitness accounts of the incident
indicating that the actions of the British soldiers were not provoked by violence on the
part of the victims). In 1998, the British government announced the creation of a second
Bloody Sunday Inquiry into the day's events. To date, it is the largest and most
expensive public inquiry in British history. Publication of the Inquiry's final report has
been continually delayed and is still pending. See Bloody Sunday Inquiry, http://www.
bloody-sunday-inquiry.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).

the courts) assumed greatly enhanced roles in the state's response to the
paramilitary threat.2 8 As the primary theater of conflict moved off the
streets and into the courtrooms and prisons of Northern Ireland, the
number of lethal force deaths dropped significantly.29
Nonetheless, Britain faced substantial international criticism for the
legal processes implemented during the normalization phase, as their
deviations from the patterns of the ordinary criminal justice system
became apparent. 30 For example, in its landmark 1978 decision Ireland
v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that the
so-called "five techniques" employed during interrogations in Northem
Ireland amounted to "inhuman or degrading treatment" under Article 3
of the European Convention. 3'
The normalization phase contained the seeds of its undoing. The
removal of "special category status" from paramilitary prisoners gave
rise to prison protests and the hunger strikes of 1980-81. This in turn
provided the republican movement with the•"32
political momentum necessary
to reinvigorate its war against the British state. The counterinsurgency
phase, which began in the wake of the hunger strikes and lasted until the
paramilitary ceasefires in 1994, was characterized by a renewed campaign
of violence on the part of paramilitary groups and proactive military
activity by state agents.33 Five of the six incidents at issue in the Jordan
et al. decisions occurred during this period.
Broadly speaking, Britain's counterinsurgency initiatives during the
1980s and early 1990s took two forms. First, the state infiltrated paramilitary
organizations with informers, obtained information regarding terrorist
28. NiAOLAIN, supra note 21, at 44-56.
29. Id. at 52. Between 1975 and 1980, fifty-four individuals were killed by
security forces. Id.
30. See id. at 55-56.
31. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 58-62, 79-81 (1978). The
"five techniques" used in Northern Ireland were: forcing detainees to remain in "stress
positions" for long periods of time, putting bags on detainees' heads, exposing detainees
to continuous white noise, depriving detainees of sleep, and depriving detainees of food
and drink. Id. at 58. Article 3 of the European Convention declares: "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." European
Convention, supra note 14, art. 3.
32. Prior to the removal of special category status, paramilitary prisoners in
Northern Ireland enjoyed a status similar to that afforded to prisoners of war under the
Geneva Conventions. See Ni AOLAIN, supra note 21, at 45. After its removal, these
prisoners were treated in a manner consistent with that of ordinary criminals. Id
Republican prisoners engaged in a lengthy and multifaceted protest aimed at the
reinstitution of special category status, culminating in hunger strikes that led to the
deaths of ten prisoners. The hunger strikes resulted in international criticism of the
British government and renewed support, both in Northern Ireland and abroad, for the
IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein. See generally DAVID BERESFORD, TEN MEN DEAD:
THfE STORY OF THE 1981 IRISH HUNGER STRIKE (1987).
33. See Ni AOLAIN, supra note 21, at 57-70.
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plots, and used specialized military and police units to engage paramilitaries
in set-piece confrontations.34 These confrontations frequently culminated in
the use of overwhelming lethal force against paramilitary suspects even
when it appeared that the suspects might easily have been arrested or
otherwise prevented from carrying out attacks.
This recurring pattern
of violence gave rise to allegations that the state was following a "shootto-kill" policy in regard to IRA suspects.
As a result of the HMSU's activities in County Armagh in 1982, the
British government launched an inquiry into shoot-to-kill allegations
36
under the leadership of John Stalker, a British police detective.
Stalker's investigation allegedly uncovered evidence of the existence of
a shoot-to-kill policy, but its findings were suppressed by the government
and lethal force deaths resulting from set-piece confrontations continued.3 7
The shoot-to-kill controversy was perpetuated by a series of incidents,
including the Kelly and Others incident, during which eight IRA
members were killed during a raid on a rural police station in 1987,38 the
McCann incident, involving the deaths of three IRA activists in Gibraltar
in 1988, 9 and the Jordan incident, where an IRA member in West
Belfast was shot and killed while allegedly transporting illegal weapons
in 1992.40 The general failure of domestic courts to hold state agents
criminally liable for their use of lethal force exacerbated nationalist
outrage at these incidents. For example, between 1974 and 1994, thirty-

34.

See id. at 58-64, 66-70. See also TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 270-85 (describing

a number of the most controversial counterinsurgency incidents from the 1980s).
35. See NiAOLAIN, supra note 21, at 60-62, 66-68.
36. See id. at 60.
37.

See generally

JOHN STALKER, THE STALKER AFFAIR

(1988) (providing a

firsthand account of the investigation and subsequent cover-up).
38. See Kelly and Others, supra note 13. In 1987, eight men from the IRA's East
Tyrone Brigade launched an attack on the RUC station in the village of Loughgall. See
TAYLOR,

supra note 4, at 271-78. The British Army had advance warning of the attack,

and when the IRA unit arrived in Loughgall they were ambushed by the Army and RUC.
Kelly and Others, supra note 13,
12-14. All eight IRA members were killed, along
with an innocent bystander, Anthony Hughes. Id. 28, 43.
39. See infra Part II.B.

40.

In 1992, the RUC received word that the IRA was planning to move weapons

in the IRA stronghold of West Belfast. Jordan, supra note 13,

19. Members of the

HMSU mistakenly identified a vehicle driven by IRA member Pearse Jordan as the car
containing the weapons. Id. The HMSU proceeded to run Jordan's vehicle off the road,

and fired on him as he attempted to exit the car. Id. Jordan died later after having been
transported to the hospital with gunshot wounds. Id. 16. He was unarmed at the time
he was killed, and despite initial statements to the contrary, no weapons were found in
his car. Id. 13.

four state agents were prosecuted for the use of lethal force while onduty, resulting in only eight convictions.4 1
Second, during the counterinsurgency phase, allegations arose of collusion
between state agents and members of loyalist paramilitary organizations
in carrying out assassinations of prominent Catholic nationalists.
Symbolic of the collusion issue was the murder of Patrick Finucane, a
defense lawyer who was well-known for defending IRA suspects.42
After loyalist paramilitaries murdered Finucane in his home in 1989,
evidence emerged suggesting the British Army either knew about or
actively participated in the plot. 43 Similarly, the murder of republican

political activist and suspected IRA member Patrick Shanaghan in 1991
gave rise to claims of collusion upon disclosure that the loyalists
responsible for Shanaghan's death might have possessed sensitive
British Army intelligence documents. 4 Two inquiries into allegations of
collusion carried out by high-ranking British police officer Sir John
Stevens allegedly uncovered evidence of collusion between state agents
and loyalist paramilitaries, but like the findings of the Stalker
Investigation into shoot-to-kill allegations these reports were never made
public.45
The 1994 ceasefires called by the IRA and Combined Loyalist
Military Command, an umbrella organization representing loyalist
paramilitary groups, ushered in what might be characterized as a fourth
phase of the Troubles: conflict resolution.4 6 Paramilitary violence
dropped significantly as a result of the ceasefires.47 Similarly, state

41.
42.

Ni AOLAtN, supra note 21, at 73.
For a thorough account of the murder of Patrick Finucane and its important

place in the overall collusion controversy, see JUSTIN O'BRIEN, KILLING FNUCANE:
MURDER N DEFENCE OF THE REALM (2005).
43. See Finucane, supra note 15, 7 24-25. Brian Nelson, the intelligence officer
for the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the loyalist paramilitary group responsible
24.
for Finucane's death, was an informant for the British secret service. Id.
Following Finucane's murder, evidence emerged that Nelson had informed his handlers
of the plot to kill the solicitor before the assassination was carried out. Id. 25.
44. See Shanaghan, supra note 13, 7 12-27. Prior to his death, Shanaghan had
received a warning from the British Army that sensitive intelligence documents
containing his picture and other personal information had fallen out of the back of a
military vehicle, and might have ended up in the hands of loyalist paramilitaries. Id.
18. Shanaghan attempted to learn more about the contents of the missing intelligence
documents from the British Army in order to assess the threat to his life, but the Army
did not respond to his queries before he was killed. Id.
21-33 (describing the work of the Stevens
45. See Finucane, supra note 15,
collusion inquiries).
46. For an account of the 1994 ceasefires, see MCKITTRICK & MCVEA, supra note
17, at 184-213.
47. See McKITTRICK ET AL., supra note 18, at 1474 (providing figures for the total
number of deaths resulting from political violence between 1995 and 1999).
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agents were responsible for just five deaths between 1994 and 1999.48
Confrontations between the state and civilians during this period stemmed
frequently from riots and demonstrations reminiscent of those that took
place during the earliest years of the conflict. For example, Dermot
McShane, a Catholic, was killed by the British Army during the course
of a riot triggered by the government's decision to allow a provocative
Protestant march to proceed through a Catholic neighborhood in 1996.49
The 1998 Good Friday Agreement, negotiated by the governments of
the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, as well as the majority
of Northern Ireland's political parties, cemented the peace process initiated
by the paramilitary ceasefires. 50 The Agreement, which proposed a
three-tiered power-sharing structure as a means of satisfying the political
demands of both sides of the conflict, remains the foundational
document upon which Northern Ireland's peace process rests. 5 1 Among
the many problems the Agreement has faced, however, is a widespread
and lingering dissatisfaction with the lack of provisions made for coming
to terms with the violence of the past. Conspicuously absent from the
Agreement is a "'past-specific mechanism' addressed at accountability
or truth-telling. ' '52 As a result, the issue of accountability for state
violence remains a salient political and legal issue in Northern Ireland.
It is against this backdrop of decades of conflict and fragile peace that
the European Court delivered its Jordan et al. judgments between 2001
and 2003.

48. Id. at 1476.
49. McShane was involved in a riot in Derry, and was standing behind a makeshift
barrier, when an armored personnel carrier advanced on the barrier and ran him over.
9-13. Marches held annually during the summer
See McShane, supra note 15,
months by the Orange Order and other Protestant unionist organizations have long been
a flashpoint for conflict between unionists and nationalists. Violence resulting from these
marches spiked in the years following the paramilitary ceasefires, as the Orange Order
insisted on its right to follow "traditional" parade routes in the face of increased hostility
from local Catholic communities. See generally CHRIS RYDER & VINCENT KEARNEY,
DRUMCREE (2001) (providing a history of the conflict over the "marching season").
50. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 16.
51. Id.
52. Christine Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland,26 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1095, 1106 (2003).

III. EUROPEAN COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE RIGHT TO LIFE

A. Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights
The right to life occupies a vaunted position in international human
rights law-it is, essentially, the right from which all others rights are
derived. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states
54
that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Further, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) sketches the basic contours of the right to life by
requiring states to (1) afford legal protection to the right to life and (2)
refrain from arbitrary deprivation of life.55 All major regional human rights
instruments contain similar statements regarding the right to life.56
Article 2 of the European Convention establishes the right to life in the
European context. Similar to Article 6 of the ICCPR, Article 2 places an
obligation on states to legally protect the right to life and limits permissible
deprivation to a discrete set of circumstances. The text of Article 2 reads:
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by
law.
2. Deprivation shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary:
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a
person lawfully detained;

53. See, e.g., Kurt Herndl, Forewordto THE RIGHT TO LIFE ININTERNATIONAL LAW
XI (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1983) (describing the right to life as "a primordial right which
inspires and informs all other rights").
54. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at art. 3, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
55. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
56. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, opened for signature Nov.
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, availableat http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/
Basic3.American%2OConvention.htm ("Every person has the right to have his life
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of
conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."); African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, art. 4, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, available at http://wwwl.umn.
edu/humanrts/instree/zlafchar.htm ("Human beings are inviolable. Every human being
shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be
arbitrarily deprived of this right."). See also B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept and Dimensions
of the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT

TO LIFE ININTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 53, at 2-3

(describing the role of the right to life in international human rights instruments).
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c. in action lawfully taken
for the purpose of quelling a
57
riot of insurrection.

The importance of the right to life is underscored by Article 15(2) of
the European Convention, which prohibits derogation from Article 2.58
Moreover, in the Jordan et al. decisions, the European Court recognized
that Article 2 "ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the
Convention" insofar as it "enshrines one of the basic values of the
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe." 59 Yet prior to
its McCann decision in 1995, the European Court developed virtually no
jurisprudence concerning the right to life. The European Commission
screened out Article 2 complaints submitted to the Convention system
for review before they reached the Court.60
Several of these failed Article 2 complaints stemmed from the conflict
in Northern Ireland. In Irelandv. United Kingdom, the case dealing with
the treatment of terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland's interrogation
centers, the Commission held that the Article 2 portion of the complaint
was inadmissible because the applicants failed to provide evidence of
administrative practice. 6 1 Furthermore, in Stewart v. United Kingdom
and Kelly v. United Kingdom, two cases concerning the use of lethal
force against civilians by the British Army, the Commission accepted,
without criticism, the Northern Ireland High Court's factual interpretations
of the incidents and concluded that the use of lethal force had been
"absolutely necessary" under the terms of Article 2.62 The Commission
57. European Convention, supra note 14, art. 2.
58. Id. art. 15(2) ("No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths
resulting from lawful acts of war... shall be made under this provision."). In general,
Article 15 permits states to derogate from certain of their obligations under the European
Convention "in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation."
Id. art. 15(l).
59. Jordan, supra note 13,
102; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 91; McKerr,
supra note 1, 108; McShane, supra note 15, 91; Shanaghan, supra note 13, 85.
60. Under the European Convention system, the European Commission receives
initial petitions from applicants and reaches substantive decisions before such petitions
are allowed to reach the Court. See DONALD W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM
CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 13-15 (1997) (explaining
the role of the European Commission in the Convention system).
61. Ireland v. United Kingdom, supra note 31. The doctrine of administrative
practice allows the Court to consider evidence of systematic human rights abuses within
the context of its consideration of an individual claim.
62. The underlying incidents in these two cases were highly controversial. The
deceased in Stewart was a thirteen year-old boy killed by a rubber bullet. The Army
claimed that he had been taking part in a riot at the time he was shot. Stewart v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 10044/82, 39 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 162 (1984). The

therefore declared both cases inadmissible to the Court. These decisions
rendered the right to life meaningful only in theory. In practice, the
Commission had established such a high threshold for bringing an
Article 2 claim that the European Court had no opportunity to interpret
the meaning and parameters of the provision.
B. ProceduralProtectionof the Right to Life
1. McCann v. United Kingdom: ProceduralProtection
at the Planningand Control Stage
The European Court's 1995 decision in McCann v. United Kingdom
announced a sweepin change in right to life jurisprudence under the
European Convention. In McCann, the Court undertook its first analysis
of the deliberate use of lethal force by state agents. The Court's decision
identified a procedural component of the right to life. Specifically, it
held that states must plan and control law enforcement actions where the
use of lethal force is a possible outcome in such a way as to respect the
right to life of the targets of the action-even where those targets are
engaged in terrorist activity.
The underlying incident in McCann was perhaps the paradigmatic
example of the alleged shoot-to-kill policy carried out by the British
state during the counterinsurgency phase. In early 1988, British
intelligence received credible reports that the IRA planned to stage a
terrorist attack in the colony of Gibraltar.64 Daniel McCann, Mairead
Farrell, and Sean Savage were identified as the members of the IRA
"active service unit" charged with carrying out the attack. All three
were sighted in Spain on March 4, 1988 and subsequently placed under
surveillance.6 5 Their vehicle was identified as it crossed the border into
Gibraltar,6 6 but British intelligence allowed the suspects to proceed on
the grounds that permitting them to enter the territory
67 and plant their
bomb would result in greater evidence for use at trial.
The joint counterterrorist operation planned by British intelligence, the
British Army's elite Special Air Service (SAS) unit, and local Gibraltar
law enforcement officials proceeded on the basis of three interrelated
deceased in Kelly, also a teenager, was shot while driving a stolen car towards a British
Army roadblock. Despite the prevalence of such "joyriding" incidents in Belfast at the
time, the Army insisted that the soldiers believed that the deceased was a terrorist. Kelly
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17579/90, 74 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 139 (1993).
63. McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1995).
64.
65.

Id. 13.
Id. TT 21, 23.

66.
67.

Id. 138.
Id. 77 36-37.
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threat assessments: (1) McCann, Farrell, and Savage were "dangerous
terrorists" who would be armed and likely to use their weapons if
confronted; 68 (2) the attack would be carried out by means of a car
bomb, and a "blocking car" would not be used; 69 and (3) the operation
would be a "button job," meaning that the suspects would have the
capacity to detonate the bomb at considerable distance through the use
of a small, concealable device. 70 After a cursory examination of the
suspects' vehicle allegedly confirmed suspicions that it contained a
bomb,7 1 local law enforcement officials passed exclusive control of the
operation to the SAS with the understanding that the soldiers'
permissible actions included "the use of lethal force for the preservation
of life."7 2 Ultimately, the SAS confronted all three IRA suspects and
opened fire when each suspect was deemed to have acted in a manner
73
consistent with reaching for either a weapon or a detonation device.
Autopsies later determined that Farrell "had been shot three times in the
back, from a distance of some three feet .... She had five wounds to the
head and neck.",74 McCann "had been shot in the back twice and had
three wounds to the head. 7 5 Savage was "riddled with bullets," having
been shot sixteen times.76 Additionally, the pathologist determined that
strike marks in the pavement and the angle of Savage's wounds were
consistent with having been shot in the head while on the ground.77
The United Kingdom's response to the Gibraltar incident was
characterized as "a whitewash, backed up by a stone wall, followed by a
tactical retreat as contradictory evidence was presented., 78 One-by-one,
the threat assessments made by British intelligence prior to the
counterterrorist operation proved incorrect. 79 Nonetheless, the British
68. Id.723.
69. Id. The Court defined a "blocking car" as "a car not containing a bomb but
parked in the.., area in order to reserve a space for the car containing the bomb." Id.
70. Id. 77 24-3 1.
71. Id. 77 48-53.
72. Id. 54.
59-76.
73. For a description of the shootings of McCann and Farrell, see id.
For a description of the shooting of Savage, see id. 7 77-90.
74. Id. 108.
75. Id. 109.
76. Id. 110.
77. Id.
78.

JACKSON, supra note 60, at 57.

79. All three suspects were unarmed at the time of the shooting. McCann, supra
note 63, T 93. Although their intention was to detonate a car bomb in Gibraltar, the
vehicle they had parked just prior to their deaths was in fact a "blocking car" and did not

government contended that the SAS's actions were reasonable in light of
the potential terrorist threat it faced.8 °
The Court began its analysis in McCann by establishing an exceptionally
high standard of necessity
and proportionality for examining the use of
81
lethal force by the state:
[T]he use of the term "absolutely necessary" in Article 2(2) indicates that a
stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that
normally applicable when determining whether State action is "necessary in a
democratic society" under paragraph 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. In
particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of
the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2(a), (b) and (c) of Article 2.82

The Court emphasized that, due to the importance of the right to life in
democratic societies, deprivations of life by the state were subject to "the
most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is
used. 83 Therefore, the Court determined that its frame of reference for
analyzing the lawfulness of the state's actions encompassed not only the
moment at which state agents actually employed lethal force, but also "all
the surrounding circumstances including such84 matters as the planning
and control of the actions under examination.,
Using this heightened standard of review and expanded frame of
reference, the Court found that the United Kingdom's use of lethal force
against McCann, Farrell, and Savage violated Article 2 paragraph 2 of
the Convention. The Court did not find evidence of either an explicit or
implicit shoot-to-kill policy on the part of the state.8 5 Nor did it hold that
the individual SAS soldiers who used lethal force had committed a
substantive violation of the right to life.86 Instead, the Court focused on

contain explosives. Id. 9 96, 98-99. The lack of explosives in the car ruled out the
possibility that any of the suspects were reaching for a detonation device at the time they
were shot, and furthermore it was uncertain whether or not the IRA even possessed the
technological capability to carry out a "button job" in Gibraltar. Id. 9 112-17.
80. Id. 190.
81. According to Ni Aoldin, "[t]he right to life emerged from the McCann decision
as a strict scrutiny right subject to enhanced review." Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, Truth
Telling, Accountability, and the Right to Life in Northern Ireland, 5 EuR. H.R. L. Rnv.
572, 577 (2002).
82. McCann, supra note 63, 149.
83. Id. 150.
84. Id.
85. Id. 180.
86. Id. 200. The Court held that the individual soldiers' honest belief in the
necessity of their actions absolved them of any wrongdoing. According to the Court:
[T]he use of force by agents of the State in pursuit of one of the aims
delineated in Article 2(2) of the Convention may be justified under this
provision when it is based on an honest belief which is perceived, for good
reasons, to be valid at the time but which subsequently turns out to be
mistaken. To hold otherwise would be to impose an unrealistic burden on the
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three significant procedural flaws in the state's planning and control of
the counterterrorist action. First, the state's decision to allow the suspects
into Gibraltar rather than arrest them at the border represented a "serious
87
miscalculation by those responsible for controlling the operation.
Second, the Court criticized the United Kingdom's steadfast reliance on
threat assessments that proved to be false because such reliance resulted
in "the absence of sufficient allowances being made for alternative
possibilities. 88 Lastly, the Court held that the failure to allow for a
margin of error in the threat assessments was compounded by the use of
SAS soldiers who had been trained to use deadly force when confronted
with a terrorist threat of the type described by their intelligence.8 9
The Court's assessment of the applicants' claims under Article 2(1)specifically, that the British government had failed to uphold its obligation
to protect the right to life under domestic law-was not determinative in
McCann. Nonetheless, it proved extraordinarily significant in light of
the Court's subsequent Article 2 decisions. The Court recognized that
the Convention's legal prohibition on the arbitrary taking of life by the
state would be ineffective without the existence of domestic procedures
designed to review the lawfulness of the use of lethal force. 90 The Court
held that Article 2, when read in conjunction with Article 1 of the
Convention, 91 "requires by implication that there should be some form of
effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as the
result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the state., 92 In
McCann, the Court determined that the coroner's inquest held under
Gibraltar's domestic law, which took into account a substantial amount
of evidence before rendering its verdict of "lawful killing," satisfied the
ex post facto procedure requirement. 93 The Court therefore declined to
elaborate on the form an effective official investigation should otherwise

State and its law-enforcement personnel in the execution of their duty, perhaps
to the detriment of their lives and those of others.
Id.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. 7205.
Id.
206-10.
Id.TT 211-12.
Id.T 160.
European Convention, supra note 14, art. 1 (mandating that states must "secure

to everyone in their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention").
92. McCann, supra note 63, 161.
93. See id.
103-21 (describing, in detail, the evidence presented in the Gibraltar
coroner's inquest).

take.94 Although the Court followed the McCann decision with a string
of cases in which it held states liable for violating the procedural right to
life at the planning and control stage,95 it did not return to the issue of
investigations into lethal force deaths until 2000.
2. Kaya v. Turkey: ProceduralProtectionat the Investigative Stage
In its 2000 decision in Kaya v. Turkey, the Court shifted its procedural
inquiry away from the planning and control of law enforcement that
resulted in the use of lethal force to the investigation that took place after
the death occurred. In doing so, the Court identified the right to life
component that would form the basis of its subsequent Jordan et al.
decisions: the procedural right to life at the investigative stage.
Kaya concerned the death of an individual during a counterterrorist
operation carried out by Turkish security forces in southeastern Turkey.
The state alleged that the deceased was a member of the Workers' Party of
Kurdistan (PKK) and was involved in a shootout with state agents when
he was killed. 96 The deceased's brother, the applicant, by contrast, argued
that the deceased was not involved in political activity and had been
unlawfully killed by the security forces. 97 Independent fact-finding
attempts failed to verify the events as described by either side, and as a
result the Court was unable to conclude whether the deceased was killed
in the unlawful circumstances alleged by his brother. 98 Consequently, the
Court was unable to find a breach of Article 2 on the necessity and
proportionality grounds used in McCann, where the state's responsibility
for the deaths in question was undisputed. 99
Instead of abandoning its Article 2 inquiry, however, the Court turned to
an analysis of the state's ex postfacto investigation of the incident. The
Court had already established its authority to conduct such an analysis in
McCann. 00 Recalling its determination that the legal prohibition on
arbitrary killing would be meaningless if no procedures existed for
reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by the state, and
reiterating its stance that a combined reading of Articles 1 and 2 of the
94. Id. T 162 ("[I]t is not necessary in the present case for the Court to decide what
form such an investigation should take and under what conditions it should be
conducted, since public Inquest proceedings, at which the applicants were legally
represented and which involved the hearing of 79 witnesses, did in fact take place.").
95. See, e.g., Egri v. Turkey, E.H.R.R. 1998-IV; Avsar v. Turkey, Judgment, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (July 10, 2001).
96. Kaya v. Turkey, App. No. 158/1996/777/978, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., TT 1115 (Feb. 19, 1998).
97. Id. TT 9-10.
98. Id. TT 74-78.
99. See id. T 78.
100. See supranotes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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Convention obliged states to carry out effective official investigations into
lethal force deaths,' °1 the Court embarked on an analysis of the minutiae
of the investigative procedures used by Turkey following Kaya's death.
The Court criticized the lack of a thorough crime scene analysis, the
failure to take statements from soldiers involved in the shooting, the
absence of corroborating evidence from local civilians who might have
had information regarding the incident, and the ineffectiveness of the postmortem examination carried out at the scene of the shooting. 10 2 Moreover,
the Court rejected Turkey's argument that where the use of lethal force
by the security forces occurred within the context of a prolonged
counterterrorist campaign, the state was absolved of its duty to do
10 3
anything more than meet the minimal requirements of its domestic law.
Turkey's investigative failures thus led the Court to hold that it had
breached Article 2.104
C. The Jordan et al. Decisions: Effective Official
Investigations into Lethal Force Deaths
In its four joined decisions of May 4, 2001, and subsequently in
McShane and Finucane, the European Court built upon its decision in
Kaya by articulating precise standards for the procedural requirement
that states undertake "effective official investigations" into lethal force
deaths. Specifically, the Court held that such investigations must be
independent, prompt, effective, and transparent-terms which it defined
in considerable detail. Working within this framework, the Court directed
specific criticisms at the RUC, Department of Public Prosecutions
(DPP), and coroner's inquest system for their roles in investigating lethal
force deaths.

101.

102.
103.

Kaya, supra note 96,

86.
Id. TT 89-92.
Id. 91. In regard to the impact of the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign in

southeastern Turkey on its Article 2 analysis, the Court explained:
The Court notes that loss of life is a tragic and frequent occurrence in view of
the security situation in south-east Turkey. However, neither the prevalence of
violent armed clashes nor the high incidence of fatalities can displace the
obligation under Article 2 to ensure that an effective, independent investigation
is conducted into deaths arising out of clashes involving the security forces,
more so in cases such as the present where the circumstances are in many
respects unclear.
Id. (citation omitted).
104. Id. 792.

1. Components of an Effective Official Investigation
According to Ni Aoldin, "[e]ffective official investigation becomes the
mantra of [the Jordan et al. decisions] and the significance of what that
means is spelt out in some detail. There is a sense that the Court is not
allowing the state any room to hide under vague and general platitudes
15
These
but rather wants specific imperatives to follow the principle."'
The
law.
rights
human
in
international
rooted
firmly
are
imperatives
Court grounded its analysis in the United Nations Basic Principles on the
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials ("UN Force
and Firearms Principles"), which require states to engage in an "effective
review process" of lethal force deaths caused by their agents. 10 6 In addition,
the Court found support for its analysis in the United Nations Principles
on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions ("UN Principles on Extra-Legal Executions"),
which require "a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation" into lethal
force deaths carried out by an investigative authority with the power to
compel testimony from law enforcement officials involved in the fatal
incident. 0 7 The Court also discussed the relevance of the United Nations'
"Minnesota Protocol," which provides minimum guidelines for the conduct
of inquiries into suspicious deaths, particularly those caused by the
state. 108
Based on these international principles, the Court identified four basic
components of an effective official investigation. First, the individuals
charged with carrying out the investigation must be "independent from
those implicated in the events.' 1 9 According to the Court, this requires
"not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a
practical independence." ' 10 For example, it would not be sufficient for
the police to investigate allegations of unlawful killing on the part of the
military where the police and military have strong cross-institutional or
operational ties."'

105.

Ni Aol~in, supra note 81, at 581.

106.
107.
108.

See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 13,
See, e.g., id. 91.
See, e.g., id. 92.

87-89.

109. Id. 106; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 95; McKerr, supra note 1, 112;
Shanaghan, supra note 13, 89; McShane, supra note 15, 95; Finucane, supra note 15,
68.

110. Jordan, supra note 13, 106; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 95; McKerr,
supra note 1, 112; Shanaghan, supra note 13, 89; McShane, supra note 15, 95;
Finucane, supra note 15, 68.
111. See Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 114; McShane, supra note 15, Ill
(both holding that the police investigation lacked the requisite independence even though

the victims were killed by the military).
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Second, investigations must be capable of leading "to a determination
of whether the force used ...was or was not justified in the circumstances"
and "identify[ing] and punish[ing] ...those responsible."1' 12 The Court
stressed, however, that this was "not an obligation of result, but of
means."1 13 The effectiveness of investigations should be judged not on
their actual outcomes, but rather on the reasonableness of the steps taken
during the investigation and their utility for establishing the cause of
death and the persons responsible.
Third, investigations into lethal force deaths must be prompt. The
Court recognized that investigations might be delayed for a variety of
reasons specific to a given situation, but nonetheless required that
investigations proceed with "reasonable expedition."'1 4 Promptness, in
the Court's view, is integral to the broader political and social credibility
of the investigation into a lethal force death: "[A] prompt response ...may
generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in
[the investigating authority's] adherence to the rule of law and in
preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. '1 5
Fourth, effective official investigations must be transparent. In other
words, they must be open to a degree of public scrutiny. 116 Most importantly,
the Court insisted that transparency requires that "[i]n all cases ...the
next-of-kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent
necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests."1' 17 The role of the
victims' families in the investigative process was a central concern in all
six Jordan et al. decisions.

112. Jordan, supra note 13,
supra note 1, 113; Shanaghan,
Finucane, supra note 15, 69.
113. Jordan, supra note 13,
supra note 1, 113; Shanaghan,
Finucane, supra note 15, 69.
114. Jordan, supra note 13,
supra note 1, 114; Shanaghan,
Finucane, supra note 15, 70.
115. Jordan, supra note 13,
supra note 1, 114; Shanaghan,
Finucane, supra note 15, 70.
116. Jordan, supra note 13,
supra note 1, 115; Shanaghan,
Finucane, supra note 15, 71.
117. Jordan, supra note 13,
supra note 1, 115; Shanaghan,
Finucane, supra note 15, 71.

107; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 96; McKerr,
supra note 13, 90; McShane, supra note 15, 96;
107; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 96; McKerr,
supra note 13, 90; McShane, supra note 15, 96;
108; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 97; McKerr,
supra note 13, 91; McShane, supra note 15, 97;
108; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 97; McKerr,
supra note 13,
91; McShane, supra note 15,
97;
109; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 98; McKerr,
supra note 13, 92; McShane, supra note 15, 98;
109; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 98; McKerr,
supra note 13, 92; McShane, supra note 15, 98;

2. Criticismsof the UnitedKingdom's Investigative Mechanisms
The Court rejected the British government's contention that investigations
carried out by the police and DPP, the coroner's inquest process, and
civil proceedings initiated in connection with four of the six Jordan et
al. decisions cumulatively satisfied Article 2's procedural requirements.
It summarily dismissed the utility of civil proceedings in such matters on
the grounds that (1) these proceedings were initiated by the applicants,
not the state, and (2) the civil proceedinfs were incapable of identifying
and punishing any alleged perpetrators.
Responsibility for initiating
outcome-oriented investigations into lethal force deaths therefore rests
with the state. In terms of the other investigative mechanisms, the Court
conceded that the cumulative actions of various state agencies might in
some circumstances satisfy Article 2's procedural requirements, but held
9
that in these six cases the mechanisms employed by investigation.'
official the United Kingdom
failed to meet the standards for an effective
a. Police Investigations
The Court held that the police investigations into all six Jordan et al.
incidents failed to evince the independence required by the procedural
component of Article 2.120 In Jordan and McKerr, responsibility for the
investigation rested with RUC officers who were institutionallyr and
hierarchically connected to the officers responsible for the deaths. 1 In
Kelly and Others and McShane, where the RUC conducted investigations
into deaths caused by military personnel, the Court concluded that the
RUC's role in the underlying counterinsur ency actions compromised its
independence in investigating the soldiers.'
In Shanaghan and Finucane,
where collusion between state agents and loyalist paramilitaries allegedly
resulted in the deaths, the Court criticized the police investigation for
failing to promptly address the accusations of collusion and held that the
RUC investigators were not sufficiently independent
from the state
23
agents who allegedly plotted with the paramilitaries.1

118. Jordan, supra note 13, 105; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 94; McKerr,
supra note 1, 111; Shanaghan, supra note 13, T 88.
119. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 13, 100.
120. Jordan, supra note 13,
118-19; Kelly and Others, supranote 13,
113-15;
McKerr, supra note 1,
124-29; Shanaghan, supra note 13,
102-05; McShane,
supra note 15,
109-14; Finucane, supra note 15, $ 74-76.
121. Jordan, supra note 13, 119; McKerr, supra note 1, 124-29.
122. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
123. Shanaghan, supra note 13, 99 102-05; Finucane, supra note 15, TT 74-76.
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b. Departmentof Public Prosecutions
The Court criticized the DPP's failure, in five of the six incidents, to
provide reasons for deciding not to seek prosecutions. 124 The Court
noted, however, that Northern Ireland's domestic law did not require the
DPP to give reasons for its decisions.1 25 Moreover, in Northern Ireland,
unlike in England and Wales, judicial review of the DPP's decisions was
virtually impossible due to the inability of coroner's inquest juries to
return verdicts such as "unlawful killing" that would provide
26 a basis for
legal challenges to the DPP's initial prosecutorial decision.1
The lack of transparency in the DPP's decision-making process also
undermined the effectiveness of the British government's response to the
lethal force deaths in question. The DPP's failure to give reasons for its
decisions limited the potential for public scrutiny of such cases and
hindered the full participation of the victims' families in the investigatory
process.127 These failures were compounded where, as in Northern Ireland,
"the police investigation procedure itself is open to doubts of a lack of
independence and is not amenable to public scrutiny.' 28 Crucially, the
Court seems to imply that the combined actions of the police and DPP in
response to lethal force deaths undermined public confidence in legal
processes generally.
c. Coroner'sInquests
The Court recognized the importance of coroner's inquests in the
debate over lethal force deaths in Northern Ireland. Because of the
general lack of criminal prosecutions and public inquiries in connection
with such matters, inquests became the primary vehicle for investigating
deaths caused by the state. 2 9 In McCann, the Court held that the coroner's
inquest into the Gibraltar deaths satisfied the United Kingdom's
124. Reasons for the decision not to prosecute were only given in McShane, and
then only under the threat of legal action by the family of the victim. See McShane,
supra note 15, 88.
125. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 13, 7 122.
126. See id.
127. Kelly and Others, supra note 13, $ 113-15; McKerr, supra note 1, 124-29;
Shanaghan, supra note 13,
102-05; McShane, supra note 15, 114; Finucane, supra
note 15, TT 74-76.
128. Jordan, supra note 13, 123; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, T 117; McKerr,
supra note 1, 123; Shanaghan, supra note 13, 107; Finucane, supra note 15, 82.
129. Ni Aoldin, supra note 81, at 584.

obligations under Article 2(1) of the Convention because it "provided a
detailed review of the events surrounding the killings and provided the
relatives of the deceased with the opportunity to examine and crossexamine witnesses involved in the operation."' 130 By contrast, in the
Jordan et al. decisions, the Court harshly assessed the role of inquests in
Northern Ireland.
The Court identified two significant flaws in the Northern Ireland
inquest procedure. First, Rule 9(2) of the Northern Ireland Coroner's
Rules did not allow authorities to compel those suspected of causing
death to give evidence.' 3 1 In the incidents at issue in the Jordan et al.
decisions, as in most other incidents concerning the state's use of lethal
force in Northern Ireland, the security force personnel implicated in the
deaths did not attend the inquests and provided only limited testimony
through written statements or interview transcripts. 3 2 In the Court's
view, the inability of the coroner's inquests to compel testimony from
those responsible for causing death "detract[ed] from the inquest's
capacity to establish the facts immediately relevant to the death, in
particular the lawfulness of the use of force."' 133 As a result, the inquests
failed to meet the 34critical effectiveness component of Article 2's
procedural mandate.1
Second, the Court took issue with the restricted scope of permissible
verdicts under Northern Ireland's coroner's rules. While coroner's juries
in England and Wales-and also in Gibraltar, under whose laws the
inquest in McCann operated-were capable of returning a number of
verdicts, including "unlawful killing," in Northern Ireland coroner's
juries were limited to determining (1) the identity' of the deceased person
and (2) the date, place, and cause of death.
This limitation on
permissible verdicts constrained the effectiveness of inquests insofar as
it rendered them only marginally useful in conducting future criminal
prosecutions. In England and Wales, if the jury rendered a verdict of
"unlawful killing," it would oblige the DPP to reconsider an initial
decision not to prosecute and would require the DPP to give reasons for
a continued decision not to prosecute that could be challenged in the
courts. 1 36

By contrast, in Northern Ireland, judicial review of the DPP's

decisions was not possible in large part because coroner's inquests could
not pass judgment on the lawfulness of the killing. Under these
130.

Jordan, supranote 13,

131.

Id.

132.

Id. T 127.

133.

68, 127.

Id.

134.
135.

Id.
Id. TT 64, 129.

136.

Id. T 129.

125.
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circumstances, "the only relevance the inquest [had] to a possible
prosecution [was] that the Coroner [might] send a written report to the
'
DPP if he consider[ed] a criminal offence may have been committed."137
It was not apparent, however, that in the event such a letter was sent to
the DPP, it would be under any obligation to reconsider
its decision or to
138
provide reasons for refusing to take further action.
In all six cases, the Court determined that the inquests did not satisfy
the promptness component of an effective official investigation. Each of
the inquests was substantially delayed in commencement, and several
were postponed in the midst of the proceedings. 139 Most egregiously,
the inquest into the McKerr incident was still ongoing nearly twenty
years after the deaths occurred. 140 The Court tied the issue of promptness to
its consideration of the transparency of the inquests-specifically, the
involvement of next-of-kin in the process. Delays in the inquest
procedures frequently resulted from the state's failure to provide the
victims' families with witness statements and other information critical
to their meaningful participation in the process, which led to prolonged
legal wrangling over disclosure. The Court held that the next-of-kin's
inability to review documents produced to the inquest was a significant
flaw in the investigative process.141 Moreover, the Court recognized that
the reluctance to disclose such documents during inquests in Northern
Ireland was notably at odds with the practice prevailing elsewhere in the
United Kingdom in the wake of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, which
had liberalized the rules
governing disclosure of documents in English
42
and Welsh inquests. 1

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The Jordan inquest was delayed for eight years and four months. Jordan,
supra note 13, 136. The Kelly inquest was delayed for more than eight years before it
was even opened. Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 130. The Shanaghan inquest was
delayed for over four and a half years. Shanaghan, supra note 13, 119.
140.

McKerr, supra note 1,

152.

141.

Jordan, supra note 13,

134; Kelly and Others, supra note 13,

supra note 1,

148; Shanaghan, supra note 13,

128; McKerr,

117.

142. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 13,
84. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry
investigated the death of a black youth in London at the hands of a gang of white
teenagers, and uncovered significant failings on the part of the London Metropolitan
Police in investigating the incident. The full report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry is
availableat http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm42/4262/sli-00.htm.

IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S RESPONSES TO THE
JORDAN ETAL. DECISIONS

Member states of the Council of Europe are required under international
law to honor the decisions of the European Court and to ensure
compliance with its decisions in domestic law and practice.' 4 3 A
Committee of Ministers under the auspices of the Council of Europe
supervises the execution144of the Court's judgments in the states against
which they are directed.
In March 2002, the British government submitted a 35-point "package
of measures" to the Committee of Ministers detailing the steps it planned
to take in order to implement the Jordan et al. decisions. 145 The package
of measures spoke only to future-oriented institutional reforms. It did
not recommend new investigations into the incidents at issue in Jordan
et al., and indeed the United Kingdom has avoided launching any new
investigations. 146 Moreover, by means of the Human Rights Act 1998
143. European Convention, supra note 14, art. 46(1) ("The High Contracting Parties
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are
parties.").
144. Id., art. 46(2) ("The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the
Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.").
145. The government's submission is unpublished. For a summary of its proposals,
see Christine Bell & Johanna Keenan, Lost on the Way Home? The Right to Life in
Northern Ireland, 32 J. L. & Soc'Y 68, 76 (2005). See also Comm. of Ministers, Interim
Resolution RESDH(2005)20-Action of the Security Forces in Northern Ireland:
Measures taken or envisaged to ensure compliance with the judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights in the cases againstthe United Kingdom listed in Appendix III,
40 E.H.R.R. SE26 (2005) [hereinafter February 2005 Interim Resolution] (setting forth
the United Kingdom's proposals as of February 2005 at Appendix II).
146. See Comm. of Ministers, Cases Concerning the Action of Security Forces in
Northern Ireland-Stocktaking of Progress in Implementing the Court's Judgments,
CM/Inf/DH(2006)4 revised 2 (June 23, 2006), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=
1014497 [hereinafter June 2006 Information Document]. A new inquest in the Jordan
190-91.
case was placed on hold pending a decision by the House of Lords. See id.
This decision was handed down in March 2007 and has limited the permissible scope of
any future inquest into the Jordan incident. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying
text. A 2004 judgment by the House of Lords declined to order a fresh investigation into
McKerr. See June 2006 Information Document, supra, 193; see also infra notes 16568 and accompanying text. The case is now subject to a forthcoming investigation by
the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. See June 2006 Information Document,
supra, 196; see also infra Part IV.A. The government has suggested that the Kelly and
Others and Shanaghan cases fall within the terms of reference of the Historical Enquiries
Team recently established to investigate open murder files relating to the conflict in
Northern Ireland, but at this point there is no evidence that these investigations have
commenced. See June 2006 Information Document, supra, 200-01, 205-06; see also
infra Part IV.A. An inquest into the McShane incident was expected to begin in 2005,
but has been delayed. See June 2006 Information Document, supra, 99 197-98. The
government's sole concession in Finucane has been to propose a public inquiry into the
solicitor's death, although one individual has been convicted for his role in Finucane's
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(HRA), 147 the British judiciary has developed a domestic right to life
jurisprudence that has limited the applicability of Article 2's procedural
protections in the domestic context. Consequently, the Committee of
Ministers has expressed a degree of dissatisfaction with the United
Kingdom's response to the Jordan et al. decisions. In its June 2006
assessment of the United Kingdom's progress, the Committee recognized
that institutional reforms were moving in the direction of compliance
with the decisions but also criticized the United Kingdom for failing to
fulfill its "continuing obligation" 148
to conduct Article 2-compliant
investigations into the deaths at issue.
A. InstitutionalReforms
The institutional reforms initiated by the British government have
been described as a "piece-meal and minimalist approach to addressing
49
discrete.., defects" identified by the European Court in Jordan et al.1
The United Kingdom has refrained from engaging in a comprehensive
reform program. For example, the United Kingdom has not established
new, Article 2-compliant mechanisms for investigating lethal force
deaths and prosecuting those accused of the illegal deprivation of life.
Instead, it has made minor changes to pre-existing structures.
The government's response to the Court's criticism of police
investigations relies heavily on changes to Northern Ireland's policing
structures that pre-date the Jordan et al. decisions. Police reform was a
central component of the Good Friday Agreement, which sought to
make the police force human rights compliant and acceptable to both
segments of the community. 50 The 1999 Patten Report recommended a
far-reaching overhaul of the RUC, and its findings resulted in a substantial

murder. See id. 202. The proposed terms of the inquiry have caused a great deal of
public controversy, and the inquiry has yet to be established. See infra notes 246-53 and
accompanying text.
147. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, availableat http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/actsl998/
19980042.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
148. June 2006 Information Document, supra note 146, 244.
149. Bell & Keenan, supra note 145, at 75.
150. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 16, at art. 9, annexes A and B
(proposing the creation of a Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland and a review
of Northern Ireland's criminal justice system).

reconfiguration of Northern Ireland's police force, now known as the
Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). 151
The British government has also relied on the creation of the
independent Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland as a means to
respond to the Committee of Ministers. 5 2 Under the Police (Northern
Ireland) Act, the Police Ombudsman is given the power to investigate
allegations of misconduct and abuse on the part of the PSNI, including
allegations of the illegal use of lethal force.
The British government
has claimed that the existence of the Police Ombudsman alleviates the
independence issues raised
by the Jordan et al. decisions in relation to
54
police investigations. 1
Although the Ombudsman is structurally separate from the PSNI, and
therefore capable of carrying out independent investigations of the
police, its mandate does not cover situations where the army is responsible
for the deaths in question. According to the British government, such
incidents will be investigated by the PSNI despite the European Court's
determination, in Kelly and Others and McShane, that police investigations
into the use of lethal force by the military do not meet the Article 2
standard for independence where the police and military have clear
operational links.'5 5 While this issue is less likely to arise in future cases
given the limited role currently played by the British Army in Northern
Ireland, the PSNI's lack of independence poses a significant problem for
investigations of lethal force incidents that occurred during the past
151.
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, A NEW
BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1999), availableat http://www.nio.gov.uk/a_

new beginninginpolicingin northemireland.pdf [hereinafter PATTEN REPORT]. See
also Police Service of Northern Ireland; http://www.psni.police.uk (providing an overview
of Northern Ireland's current policing system).
152. See Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, http://www.policeombudsman.org.
Nuala O'Loan serves as the Police Ombudsman. See id. At O'Loan's disposal is a staff of
over 100, including a team of independent investigators. See June 2006 Information
Document, supra note 146, 9.
153. Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 2000, c. 32, Part VII, available at http://www.
opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000032.htn [hereinafter Police (Northern Ireland) Act] (establishing
the statutory powers of the Police Ombudsman). See also Police Ombudsman for
Northern Ireland, "What We Do," at http://www.policeombudsman. org/about.cftn ("[W]e
can investigate a matter if we have reason to think that a police officer may have
committed a criminal offence or broken the police code of conduct. We can also
investigate a matter if the Secretary of State, the Chief Constable or the Policing Board
asks us to.").
154. See Comm. of Ministers, Cases Concerning the Action of Security Forces in
Northern Ireland, Information Document CM/Inf/DH(2005)21, 6 Oct. 2005,
9
[hereinafter October 2005 Information Document] ("[T]he United Kingdom government
has indicated that, since November 2000, there has been an independent Police
Ombudsman in Northern Ireland with the power to investigate all complaints against the
police .... The Ombudsman is completely independent in deciding what is a complaint
and how it should be handled.").
155. See supranotes 111, 122 and accompanying text.

[VoL. 9: 81, 2007]

Seeking the Final Court ofJustice
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

conflict. Similarly, the Ombudsman's capacity for carrying out historical
investigations is also limited by its ability to investigate incidents that
occurred prior to the signing of the Good Friday
Agreement only where
156
such incidents were "grave and exceptional."'
Reform of the DPP's role in handling lethal force deaths has focused
on the issue of giving reasons for decisions not to prosecute. In March
2002, the Attorney General made a general statement in the House of
Lords in favor of giving reasons in future cases concerning the use of
lethal force by state agents. 57 This policy statement is reflected in the
text of the Code for Prosecutors developed for use by Northern Ireland's
new Public Prosecution Service (PPS). 5 8 Critically, however, the Code
also gives the PPS the right to refuse to give reasons based on "public
interest considerations."'' 59
It remains unclear whether such changes will impact the extent to
which reasons are given in controversial cases such as those in Jordan et
al. Thus far, the PPS has given reasons for its continued decision not to
60
seek prosecutions in only one of the Jordan et al. cases: McKerr.'
Additionally, the Northern Ireland Queen's Bench decision in In Re
John Boyle called into question
the judiciary's commitment to reviewing
161
decisions not to prosecute.
Absent judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial
decisions, policy statements in favor of giving reasons are likely to
produce little change in the way prosecutions are handled.
Changes to the coroner's inquest system are arguably the most
extensive responses to the Jordan et al. decisions. The 2003 Luce
Review of coroner's practices in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland
recommended changes to the inquest system that, if implemented in their
156.
157.

See infra Part IV.A.
See February 2005 Interim Resolution, supra note 143, at 5.

158.

PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, CODE FOR PROSECUTORS,

4.12.4, available at http://www.ppsni.gov.uk/site/default.asp?CATID=77 [hereinafter
CODE FOR PROSECUTORS] (generally supporting the giving of reasons in cases "occasioned
by the conduct of agents of the State"). The Public Prosecution Service was established as
part of the ongoing review of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. It has
assumed the prosecutorial responsibilities previously held by the DPP. See Public
Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland, http://www.ppsni.gov.uk/site/default.asp?CATID=3,
(About the PPS) (last visited Aug. 22, 2007).
159.

CODE FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 158, § 4.12.4.

160. See Bell & Keenan, supra note 145, at 75 n.22.
161. In Re John Boyle [2004] NIQB 63 (N. Ir.) (failing to undertake judicial review
of the DPP's decision not to prosecute). See also Bell & Keenan, supra note 145, at 75
("Whether the DPP's stated policy will produce further reasons in cases of alleged state
wrongdoing remains to be tested, although early evidence is not encouraging.").

162
entirety, could help ensure that the inquests are Article 2 compliant.
Further, Northern Ireland's coronial laws have been amended to require
state agents suspected of involvement in suspicious deaths to attend the
inquests. Nonetheless, these state agents may still refuse to answer
63
questions on the grounds that their answers may be self-incriminatory. 1
Consequently, despite these changes in the law, coroner's inquests
may continue to fail to meet Article 2's requirements. Other coroner's
inquest reform issues-such as the scope of inquests, the types of
permissible verdicts, and the need for public transparency-lie at the
heart of several recent domestic cases that have raised doubts about the
parameters of the right to life within the United Kingdom.

B. Domestic Right to Life Decisions
The lynchpin of the reforms carried out by the British government in
the wake of the Jordan et al. decisions is the Human Rights Act 1998
(HRA). The Act entered into force on October 2, 2000, and purports to
incorporate the rights created by the European Convention into United
Kingdom domestic law. Specifically, Article 6(1) of the HRA prohibits
"public authorities" such as police, prosecution services, and coroner's
services from64 acting in a manner "incompatible" with the European
Convention. 1
Domestic courts have raised three major issues concerning the
applicability and content of the HRA and the right to life under British
domestic law. First, domestic courts have questioned whether the HRA
applies to cases in which the death occurred prior to its entry into force
on October 2, 2000. Second, domestic courts have grappled with the

162. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, DEATH CERTIFICATION AND
INVESTIGATION IN ENGLAND, WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND: THE REPORT OF A

2003, Cm. 5831 [LUCE REVIEW]. Among the recommendations
made by the Luce Review were: greater coordination between coroners and the police;
greater involvement of the next-of-kin of the victim in the inquest process; expanded
terms of reference for inquests, including allowing coroners to examine the "immediate
circumstances" surrounding the death; the holding of public inquests for victims killed
by "law and order services;" and allowing coroners to consider the role of specific
individuals in causing death. Id. at 200-05. Most importantly, the Luce Review concluded
that "[iun cases engaging Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights the
inquest should in principle be the main forum for the investigation, in conjunction as
appropriate with other investigative processes for which the State is responsible." Id. at
226.
163. See Coroners (Amendment) Rules (Northern Ireland) 2002, S.R. 37, § 9(1) (N.
Ir.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/sr/sr2002/20020037.htm ("No witness at an
inquest shall be obliged to answer any question tending to incriminate himself or his
FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW,

spouse.").
164. Human Rights Act, supra note 147, at art. 6(1) ("It is unlawful for a public
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.").
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requirements that the HRA places on "public authorities," in particular
coroner's inquests, in right to life cases. Lastly, in the Widgery Soldiers
decision, the English Court of Appeals established a balancing test for
comparing substantive and procedural right to life claims that arguably
limits the prospects for holding state agents accountable for the illegal
use of lethal force. Taken together, these three strands of domestic right
to life jurisprudence call into question the United Kingdom's commitment
to honoring the letter and spirit of the Jordan et al. decisions, especially
as regards incidents of lethal force that occurred during the Troubles.
1. Retrospective Application of the Human Rights Act
The most important question arising out of domestic right to life
jurisprudence is whether the HRA applies retroactively to deaths that
occurred before October 2, 2000. In In Re McKerr (2004), the House of
Lords overturned an earlier Northern Ireland Court of Appeals decision
that would have required the British government to undertake a new,
Article 2-compliant investigation into the deaths of McKerr, Toman, and
Bums. 165 The Lords held that the HRA did not require a new investigation
because the rights66 enshrined in the HRA did not exist at the time the
deaths occurred. 1
In Re McKerr effectively established a twin-track approach to the
right to life in the United Kingdom.' 67 First, it held that the procedural
protections established by the European Court in Jordan et al. exist only
at the international level. They do not, in and of themselves, constitute a
domestic right. Second, although the HRA does contain a procedural
right analogous to that contained in Article 2 of the European Convention,
the domestic right only applies to deaths that occurred after the HRA
came into force. Petitioners bringing claims resulting from pre-HRA
deaths have no redress in domestic courts and therefore must take their
claims to the European Court. Crucially, In Re McKerr absolved the
United Kingdom of any obligation to reinvestigate the Jordan et al.
incidents, notwithstanding the European Court decisions and the

165.
166.
167.

In Re McKerr, [2004] UKHL 12 (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
Id.
See FIONA DOHERTY & PAUL MAGEEAN, NORTHERN IRELAND

HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, INVESTIGATING LETHAL FORCE DEATHS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 24-25

(2006).

Committee of Ministers' insistence that the United Kingdom is under
a
"continuing obligation" to conduct effective official investigations. 168
In Re McKerr was notably at odds with two House of Lords decisions
rendered on the exact same day: Middleton and Sacker. 69 Both cases
involved the deaths of individuals in English prisons prior to the
implementation of the HRA, yet in both cases, the Lords assumed the
HRA's retrospective application and applied Article 2 standards to the
United Kingdom's ex post facto investigation of the deaths. As the
Lords in Middleton explained: "In this appeal no question was raised on
the retrospective application of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the
[European] Convention.' 170 They were assumed to be applicable. 17' The
decision in Sacker
contained a similar statement regarding retrospective
72
application. 1
Two decisions by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeals, Re Jordan's
Application and Re McCaughey and Grew, muddied the waters further
regarding the HRA's retrospective application. 173 In Re Jordan's
Application, one in a series of cases concerning judicial review of the
coroner's inquest into Pearse Jordan's death, the appellate court accepted
the applicants' argument that Article 3 of the HRA 174 was generally
applicable as a tool of statutory construction and thus applied to all
ongoing inquest proceedings regardless of the House of Lords' decision
in In Re McKerr. 75 Referencing the discrepancy between In Re McKerr
and the Middleton and Sacker decisions, Girvan, J. observed that the
court had "received no real explanation how it came about that the state
authorities were taking opposite views on the applicability of the
Convention in the English cases and the Northern Ireland case."' 76
Nevertheless, just four months after Re Jordan's Application, a
differently constituted Northern Ireland Court of Appeals held in Re
McCaughey and Grew that Article 3 of the HRA only applied when

168. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
169. R. (Middleton) v. Her Majesty's Coroner for the W. Dist. of Somerset [2004] 1
A.C. 182 [hereinafter Middleton]; R. (Sacker) v. Her Majesty's Coroner for the County
of W. Yorkshire [2004] 1 W.L.R. 796 [hereinafter Sacker].
170. Middleton, supra note 169, 50.
171. Id.
172. Sacker, supra note 169, 29.
173. Re Jordan's Application for Judicial Review [2004] NICA 29 [hereinafter
Jordan's Application 2004]; Police Service of Northern Ireland v. Owen McCaughey and
Pat Grew [2005] NICA 1 [hereinafter McCaughey].
174. Human Rights Act, supra note 147, § 3(1) ("So far as it is possible to do so,
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way
which is compatible with the [European] Convention rights.").
175. Jordan's Application 2004, supra note 173, 23.
176. Id.
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Convention rights were applicable in the first place. 177 Because In Re
McKerr explicitly did away with Convention rights for deaths that
occurred before the HRA came into force, Article 3 could not be used to
require the British government to adhere to Article 2 procedural
standards when investigating lethal force deaths.' 7 8
Both Re Jordan's Application and Re McCaughey and Grew were
appealed to the House of Lords. 79 The Lords issued a joint decision on
the cases in March 2007.180 In the Jordan portion of this decision, the
Lords upheld In Re McKerr, affirming that the HRA does not apply
retrospectively to deaths occurring before October 2, 2000.181 Consequently,
any future coroner's inquest into Jordan's death will be prohibited from
reaching an expanded verdict similar to that upheld in Middleton and
Sacker.r82 The importance of this decision for the future of the right to
life under British domestic law cannot be overestimated. It places
significant constraints on the procedural protections of Article 2 of the
European Convention for victims of state violence during the conflict in
Northern Ireland.
2. Content of the Domestic Right to Life
Beyond the issue of when the HRA applies is the question of what
rights the HRA actually contains. Domestic decisions concerning the
HRA's content have focused on the role of coroner's inquests in death
investigations. Although the European Court's ruling in McCann made
it clear that a properly constituted inquest would satisfy Article 2's

177.

McCaughey, supra note 173,

178.

Id.

44.

See Families of IRA Men Killed by British Forces File Lawsuit at House of
179.
Lords, EVENING ECHO, Jan. 17, 2007, available at http://www.eveningecho.ie/news/
bstory.asp?j=1 70431840&p=y7x43z4zx&n=1 70432449.

180. Jordan (AP) (Appellant) v. Lord Chancellor and another (Respondents) (N.
Ir.), McCaughey (AP) (Appellant) v. Chief Constable of the Police Serv. N. Ir.
(Respondents) (N. Ir.) [2007] UKHL 14 [hereinafter Jordan & McCaughey].
181. Id. 34-35. ("Does section 3 of the Human Rights Act apply ... incases
where the death pre-dates 2 October 2000 in the light of the decision in In Re
McKerr?... No. The decision in McKerr precludes reliance on section 3 of the [HRA]
in any inquest into a death occurring before the Act came into force on 2 October
2000.").
182. Id. T 41 ("In the forthcoming, but lamentably delayed, inquest the jury may not

return a verdict of lawful or unlawful killing but may make relevant factual findings
pertinent to the killing of Pearse Jordan.").

procedural obligations, 183 in the Jordan et al. decisions the Court
declined "to specify in any detail which procedures the authorities should
adopt in providing for the proper examination of the circumstances of a
killing by State agents."' 84 Initially, this allowed the British government
to challenge cases that alleged deficiencies in the inquest procedure by
arguing that (1) the failure of one institutional mechanism did not
amount to an Article 2 violation because (2) not all the criteria needed to
be met in any one forum so long as other investigative mechanisms were
available. 185 Thus, in Re Jordan'sApplication and Re Adams' Application,
Northern Ireland courts held that the state's failure to disclose documents
relevant to the inquests did not necessarily indicate a failure of the entire
investigation. 186 The court further concluded that even where an inquest
is held, it need not be the only way for the state to discharge its Article 2
duties: other inquiries "freestanding" of inquests might also be acceptable,
meaning that coroner's8 7inquests were under no obligation to fulfill the
state's Article 2 duties.

The House of Lords generally resolved these issues in Middleton and
in Ex Parte Amin, another English death-in-custody case. 8 8 In Amin,
the House of Lords recognized that the Jordan et al. decisions require
that the state deliver a minimum level of content under the HRA in all
instances.189 Because an inquest was no longer possible in the case, the
Lords held that the state was required to satisfy its Article 2 obligations
by means of an "independent public investigation" where the victim's
family was legally represented and had access to all relevant materials. 90
In Middleton, the House of Lords affirmed that in most circumstances
coroners must assume that their inquests will represent the primary
means by which the state fulfills its Article 2 obligations. 191 Inquest
juries must be allowed to make a final determination of the state's
responsibility for the death in question. Consequently, the Lords held
183.

See McCann, supra note 63, 9 157-64 (holding that the inquest held under

Gibraltar law in the McCann case complied with Article 2's procedural requirements).
184. Jordan, supra note 13, 143; Kelly and Others, supra note 13, 137; McKerr,
supra note 1, 159; Shanaghan, supra note 13, 123.
185. Bell & Keenan, supra note 145, at 80.
186. Jordan, Re Application for Judicial Review [2001] N.I.Q.B. 32 [hereinafter
Jordan Application 2001]; Adams, Re Application for Judicial Review, [2001] N.I.C.A.
1 [hereinafter Adams Application].
187. Jordan Application 2001, supra note 186.
188. Middleton, supra note 169; R. (Amin) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2004] 1 A.C. 653 [hereinafter Amin].
189. Amin, supra note 188, 32 (holding that "the [European] Court, particularly in
Jordan ...has laid down minimum standards which must be met, whatever form the
investigation takes").
190. Id.
191. Middleton, supra note 169.
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that, in reaching a finding as to "how" a death occurred, inquests must
be capable of specifying not only "by what means" but also "in what
circumstances" an individual died. 192 This ruling broadened the required
scope of coroner's inquests and brought them in line with 93
the Gibraltar
inquest of which the European Court approved in McCann.1
The Re McCaughey and Grew decision called into question the broad
scope for coroner's inquests established in Middleton and Amin.
Keeping with its holding that Convention rights do not apply retroactively
to deaths occurring before October 2, 2000, the court held that the police
were not required to disclose all relevant documents to the coroner's
inquest. 194 This issue was considered by the Lords in its March 2007
joint decision on the Jordan and McCaughey appeals. In perhaps the
only ray of hope for Article 2's domestic application to come out of the
Lords' decision, the Lords held that, barring a successful application for
privilege or public interest immunity, the government was required to
disclose all relevant documents to the coroner's inquest.19
3. Substantive v. ProceduralRight to Life Claims
The English Court of Appeals decision in Lord Saville ofNewdigate v.
Widgery Soldiers was equally important for Article 2's domestic
application. 196 In that case, the court considered the question of whether
paratroopers involved in the events of January 30, 1972 should be
197
required to testify openly before the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in Derry.
The soldiers claimed, and the court agreed, that requiring them to testify
openly would pose a significant risk to their lives, thereby potentially
violating their substantive right to life. 198 The court found for the
soldiers and established a balancing test wherein the substantive protections
afforded by Article 2 invariably trump procedural protections-in this
192.

Id.

See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
194. McCaughey, supra note 173,
32-36.
195. Jordan & McCaughey, supra note 180, 45 ("1 would accordingly allow Mr.
McCaughey's appeal on this point, and declare that section 8 of the [Northern Ireland
Coroner's Rules] requires the Police Service of Northern Ireland to furnish to a coroner
to whom notice under section 8 is given such information as it then has or is thereafter
able to obtain (subject to any relevant privilege or immunity) concerning the finding of
the body or concerning the death.").
196. Lord Saville ofNewdigate & Ors. v. Widgery Soldiers & Ors., [2001] EWCA
(Civ) 2048 [57] [hereinafter Widgery Soldiers].
197. See supra note 27.
198. Widgery Soldiers, supra note 196.
193.

case, the right of Bloody Sunday victims' families to an effective official
investigation.199 As a result, although the soldiers were required to
testify before the inquiry, they were allowed to do so from behind
screens during a special session held in London rather than Derry.
Furthermore, in the transcripts of the proceedings, the soldiers were
identified by letters (e.g. "Soldier X") rather than by their names.2 °°
The Widgery Soldiers decision undoubtedly had a detrimental effect
on the Bloody Sunday Inquiry's capacity to fulfill its mandate. Additionally,
it may undermine other inquiries into incidents of past state violence.
This is important insofar as public inquiries and other historical investigations
currently play a critical role in the search for accountability for state
violence in Northern Ireland.
V. INVESTIGATING LETHAL FORCE DEATHS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

In Finucane, the European Court recognized the difficulties inherent
in reopening investigations into past lethal force deaths. 20 1 By their very
nature, such investigations lack the promptness necessary for an
effective official investigation. Also, given the amount of time that has
passed since the lethal force deaths (in some cases, more than thirty years), a
lack of evidence and witnesses could undermine the effectiveness of the
investigations by failing to provide a foundation for criminal prosecutions.
Despite these potential deficiencies and the contrary trend in domestic
right to life jurisprudence, investigations into past incidents of the use of
lethal force by the state have commenced in Northern Ireland in the
wake of Jordan et al. These investigations fall primarily outside the
boundaries of the ordinary criminal justice system and have taken two
forms. First, the PSNI's Historical Enquiries Team (HET) and the Police
Ombudsman have reopened files on numerous conflict-related deaths in
an attempt to reassess evidence and, where appropriate, initiate fresh
prosecutions. Second, three public inquiries have refocused attention on
the debate over collusion.
In many respects, these historical investigations offer a more effective
alternative to dealing with lethal force deaths through the criminal
justice system, where piecemeal institutional reforms are primarily
forward-looking and restrictive domestic jurisprudence hinders the
search for accountability. In this respect, historical investigations may
be better suited to ensuring that the British government complies with its
Article 2 obligations. At the same time, however, structural limitations
199. See Bell & Keenan, supra note 145, at 83; Hegarty, supra note 25, at 1179-80.
200. See Bloody Sunday Inquiry, supra note 27 (follow "Hearing Transcripts"
hyperlink).
72-83.
201. See Finucane, supra note 15,
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inherent in the mandates of the HET, Police Ombudsman, and public
inquiries may render them less than optimal for this purpose. Moreover,
historical investigations face a number of obstacles related to the United
Kingdom's general reluctance to engage in a robust domestic application
of Article 2's procedural protections with respect to Northern Ireland's
past. For example, in 2005, the United Kingdom introduced legislation
that, if passed, would have granted amnesty to a number of state agents
involved in controversial lethal force deaths. 20 2 Thus, while historical
investigations play a major role in contextualizing the important position
of lethal force deaths on Northern Ireland's legal and political landscapes,
they also further demonstrate the difficulties inherent in seeking
accountability for past state violence.
A. The HistoricalEnquiries Team and Police Ombudsman
The British government initially justified its decision not to open new
investigations into three of the Jordan et al. cases-McKerr,Kelly and
Others, and Shanaghan-inpart on the grounds that these cases would
be eligible for review by an historical investigations unit within the
PSNI.
In January 2006, the PSNI established a Historical Enquiries
Team charged with reviewing and, where appropriate, reinvestigating a
total of 3,268 deaths that took place between 1968 and the signing of the
Good Friday Agreement in 1998.204 Presumably, these cases include
deaths resulting from state violence, as well as murders by paramilitary
groups where state collusion is alleged. According to Peter Hain,
Britain's Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, it is "quite possible"
that perpetrators will face prison sentences as a result of the HET's
work.20 5

202. See infra Part IV.C.
203. February 2005 Interim Resolution, supra note 145.
204. See Press Release, Police Service of Northern Ireland, New Police Historical
Enquiries Team (Jan. 20, 2006), available at http://www.psni.police.uk/index/media
_centre/press releases/pg_pressreleases 2006/pr 2006january/pr-poice-historical-enquiriesteam.htm [hereinafter HET Press Release]. See also Historical Enquiries Team, Police

Service of Northern Ireland, http://www.psni.police.uk/index/departments/ historical_
enquiriesteam.htm [hereinafter Historical Enquiries Team] ("We envisage a reexamination process for all deaths attributable to the security situation with case reviews
leading to re-investigation in appropriate circumstances where there are evidential
opportunities.").
205.

Murder Review Team to Begin Work, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2006, http://news.

bbc.co.uk/Il/hi/northern ireland/4636634.stm.

Analysis of the HET's structures and mandates through the prism of
the Jordan et al. decisions highlights both potential benefits and drawbacks.
The HET places considerable emphasis on the role of victims' families
in the historical review process, as evidenced by one of the HET's
primary objectives: providing the next-of-kin of victims with "a greater
level of resolution."2 6 At the practical level, the HET has established a
Family Liaison to work with bereaved families by (1) soliciting from
these families their thoughts on what issues remain outstanding in
regards to their relatives' deaths, and (2) maintaining contact throughout
the review and investigation processes in order to keep them informed of
the HET's work.20 7 The Family Liaison undoubtedly represents an
attempt by the HET to comply with the requirement of transparency
established by the European Court, and has drawn cautious praise from
human rights groups.20 8
A more difficult issue is whether the HET is sufficiently independent
of the police to carry out historical reviews, especially of incidents that
call into question the actions of the security forces during the conflict.
The HET strives for a degree of independence within its ranks. Its
commander, David Cox, is a former commissioner of the London
Metropolitan Police. 20 9 Rank-and-file membership is divided between a
Review team, consisting of externally seconded officers from other
United Kingdom police forces and the Republic of Ireland's Garda
Siochana, and an Investigation team drawn from local recruits.2 10
The HET will not investigate any deaths caused by the RUC rior to
1998; instead, these will be handled by the Police Ombudsman. 2 1 While
assigning these cases to the Ombudsman raises potential problems, 21 2 it
avoids the most direct conflict-of-interest dilemma occasioned by the
HET's operations. Nonetheless, two slightly less obvious dilemmas
remain. First, it is unclear whether the HET will maintain review and
206. Historical Enquiries Team, supra note 204.
207. Id. ("Our view is that this whole initiative begins and ends with the families of
the victims. To that end, our starting point will be to include in every review an
acknowledgement of what outstanding issues have been raised by the families, and every
resolution process will include a response to address those matters.").
208. See, e.g., Jane Winter, British-Irish Rights Watch, Director'sReport, Jan. 31,
2006, http://www.birw.org/Report%202006/Jan%2006.html (noting favorably the HET's
stated intention to "share as much information as possible with bereaved families").
209. See ALAN BRECKNELL & PAUL O'CONNOR, THE PAT FINUCANE CENTRE, THE
SEARCH FOR TRUTH-PULLING HEN'S TEETH 2 (2005), available at http://www.

nihrc.org/dms/data/NIHRC/attachments/dd/files/63/fhe_s-erchfortun-th.doc (last visited Sept.
30, 2007).
210. Historical Enquiries Team, supra note 204.
211. Jane Winter, British-Irish Rights Watch, Director's Report, Dec. 31, 2005,
http://www.birw.org/report%202005/Dec%2005.html.
212. See infra notes 216-29 and accompanying text.
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investigation authority over deaths caused by paramilitaries with the
alleged collusion of state forces, most often the RUC. Collusion cases
represent a large gray area with substantial potential for mishandling
under the current investigative regime. Allowing such cases to remain
with the HET on the grounds that they are "paramilitary" rather than
"police" deaths will have the likely effect of obscuring investigations
into collusion.' 1 3 Second, there is no evidence that the HET will be
relieved of its oversight of deaths caused by the British Army. In fact,
the Police Ombudsman's limited mandate prevents it from taking such
cases. 2 14 This will lead to a situation where the HET, a unit of the PSNI,
is likely to investigate deaths caused by the military during counterinsurgency
operations in which the police played a supporting role. In Kelly and
Others and McShane, the European Court specifically held that police
investigation of the Army in such circumstances compromised the
practical independence of the investigation.21 5
The function of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland is to act
as an independent fact-finding and investigatory body for complaints
against the PSNI.2 16 Under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act, the
investigative powers of the Police Ombudsman extend primarily to
contemporary allegations of wrongdoing. 217 The Ombudsman may
review historical cases (i.e. cases arising from incidents that occurred
over one year before the bringing of a complaint, or cases relating to
events that occurred prior to the Ombudsman's establishment in 1998)
only where such investigations are warranted by "grave and exceptional"
circumstances. 2 18 Once such investigations are commenced, however,
the Police Ombudsman has the power to recommend that the PSNI
initiate internal disciplinary proceedings against certain officers, suggest
that the PSNI undertake fresh investigations, and, where warranted,
recommend that the Public Prosecution Service bring charges against
police officers implicated in wrongdoing.219

213. But see infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (describing a recent, effective
investigation into allegations of collusion carried out by the Police Ombudsman).
214. See June 2006 Information Document, supra note 146, 19.
215. See supra notes 111, 122 and accompanying text.
216. See Police Ombudsman, "What We Do," supra note 153.
217. Id.
218. See Police (Northern Ireland) Act, supra note 153.
219. Id.

The standard attached to the term "grave and exceptional" is
unclear.22 ° It appears that the Police Ombudsman has a great deal of
discretion in determining whether and under what circumstances a
historical investigation meets the requirements for further review. The
Ombudsman's recent investigation into the 1969 death of Samuel
Devenny is particularly useful in fleshing out the meaning of the term.221
Devenny died after suffering a heart attack shortly after he was beaten
by RUC officers who raided his home looking for young men involved
in a riot.222 The Ombudsman did not undertake an entirely new
investigation but rather sought to determine what the RUC had done in
response to the death when it occurred. The Ombudsman's research
revealed the existence of an RUC investigation which had determined
that the officers who raided Devenny's home were responsible, at223the
very least, for seriously wounding Devenny and members of his family.

The Devenny case raises the question of whether the Police Ombudsman
considers all historical cases involving the use of lethal force by the
RUC to be "grave and exceptional." Samuel Devenny was the second of
fifty-five individuals killed by the RUC between 1968 and 1998.224 The
HET, presumably, will turn over these investigations to the Police
Ombudsman.2 25
Although moving these investigations to the Police Ombudsman's
office eliminates the independence problem that would arise if the HET
maintained control of the files, the Ombudsman's review raises other
problems. First, the Police Ombudsman's mandate only covers serving
members of the police force, leaving open the question of whether or not
its investigations could lead to prosecutions of retired officers, who are
technically no longer part of the force.226 Second, the Police Ombudsman
may not seek prosecutions in cases where the complaints have already
been the subject of criminal proceedings or internal police disciplinary

220. See Comm. Of Ministers, Cases Concerning the Action of Security Forces in
Northern Ireland-OutstandingIssues, CM!Inf/DH(2006)4 Addendum (Jan. 27, 2006),
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=986575&Site=CM&BackColorlnternet-9999CC&B
ackColorlntranet-FFBB%%&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 ("Information on how these
terms are interpreted in practice ... would be useful ....).
221. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, Police Ombudsman Releases
Findings on Devenny Investigation, Oct. 4,2001, http://www.policeombudsman.org/
Publicationsuploads/devenny.pdf [hereinafter Devenny Report].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Submission by Jane Winter, Director, British-Irish Rights Watch, to the
House Committee on International Relations, Mar. 15, 2006, Appendix A [hereinafter
Winter Submission].
225. Id. 21.
226. Id. 16.
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hearings. 27 Although a significant number of the fifty-five historical
police killings resulted in one or both of these processes, very few
resulted in prosecutions or disciplinary actions against the officers
involved. Currently, these matters cannot be reinvestigated or retried in
domestic courts.2 28 This restriction effectively renders moot the British
government's suggestion that the McKerr case could be handled through
an historical investigation, since the three policemen responsible for the
deaths of McKerr, Toman, and Burns were already brought to trial and
cleared of wrongdoing by Lord Justice Gibson.2 29
Despite these potential constraints, the Police Ombudsman's investigations
into state violence continue to produce important results. On January
22, 2007, the Ombudsman's office released the final report of a
groundbreaking three-year investigation into allegations of collusion
between the police and loyalist paramilitaries. The investigation, known
as "Operation Ballast," uncovered evidence that loyalist paramilitary
gunmen who also acted as informers for the RUC Special Branch were
responsible for at least ten murders between 1991 and 2003.23 o In order
to maintain the services of these informers, the Special Branch allegedly
shielded them from criminal prosecution even though it was aware of the
serious crimes they had committed.2 31 Operation Ballast is arguably the
most comprehensive and convincing report on the existence of collusion
to date, and it provides strong evidence that the Ombudsman's office
may be the most well-placed historical investigation mechanism for dealing
with such allegations. Additionally, Operation Ballast sheds light on one of
the murkiest aspects of the Troubles and provides new impetus to a
series of ongoing public inquiries into collusion in Northern Ireland.
B. Public Inquiries into Collusion
The public inquiry model provides an alternative to the coroner's inquest
process for the investigation of controversial deaths.2 32 Traditionally,
227.
228.

Id. 17.
Id.

229.

See supra note 146 and accompanying text.

230.

POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, STATEMENT BY THE POLICE
OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ON HER INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE DEATH OF RAYMOND MCCORD JUNIOR AND RELATED MATTERS, Jan.

22, 2007, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/ombudsman/poni220 107
mccord.pdf (last visited March 27, 2007).
231. Id.
232. See Ni AOLAIN, supra note 21, at 175-78.

British law allows for the establishment of either statutory inquiries
under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, or non-statutory, ad
hoc inquiries.23 3 Public inquiries established under the Tribunals of
Inquiry Act are vested with comprehensive legal powers similar to those
of a High Court, including the power to compel witnesses and require the
disclosure of evidence.23 Moreover, statutory inquiries must be held in
public, and witnesses are afforded the same rights as witnesses in civil
proceedings.2 35 Ad hoc inquiries may possess these legal characteristics
to varying degrees depending on the manner in which they are constituted.
At the very least, ad hoc inquiries are expected to treat witnesses fairly and
to complete their work with reasonable efficiency and expediency.
Public inquiries normally cannot replicate the accountability and retribution
functions of criminal proceedings. As Dermot Walsh observes:
The purpose of such a Tribunal of Inquiry is not to establish the guilt or
innocence of the parties allegedly involved, but to establish the truth, if any,
behind the allegations which have led to the crisis. Where its report exposes
wrongdoing, the task of taking the necessary corrective action falls elsewhere.
The Tribunal's value lies in its capacity to persuade the public that the full facts
have been established, and 237
generally to assist in restoring public confidence in
the integrity of government.

Notwithstanding this limitation, properly conducted public inquiries can
play a meaningful role in bringing a degree of resolution to disputed
incidents. They may also provide the impetus for the criminal justice
system to undertake "necessary corrective action" in certain cases. In
England and Wales, public inquiries are an increasingly popular mode of
legal process for dealing with a variety of situations ranging from rail
accidents to medical malpractice. The
British government has been a
23 8
willing participant in these inquiries.
By contrast, public inquiries have played a much more limited and
controversial role in Northern Ireland. Five public inquiries related to
the Troubles were established between 1968 and 1979. Three of these
were ad hoc inquiries whose proceedings took place in private, 239 while
233. See Hegarty, supra note 25, at 1156-57. Use of the Tribunal of Inquiry Act is
infrequent and reserved for cases of particular importance. As of 2000, only 22 inquiries
had been established under the Act. See Ni AOLArN, supra note 21,.at 175.
234. NiAOLAIN,supra note 21, at 175.
235. Id. at 175-76.
236. Hegarty, supranote 25, at 1157.
237. Dermot Walsh, The Bloody Sunday Tribunal of Inquiry: A Resounding Defeat
for Truth, Justice, and the Rule of Law, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/bsunday/walsh.htm

(last visited May 11, 2006).
238. Hegarty, supra note 25, at 1157.
239. See id. at 1160-61. These ad hoc inquiries were the Cameron Inquiry, which
investigated the civil disturbances that marked the beginning of the Troubles in 1968; the
Bennett Inquiry, which examined allegations of police brutality and ill-treatment during
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two were established under the Tribunals of Inquiry Act and maintained
at least a modicum of public involvement.4 ° It remains questionable
whether these inquiries uncovered the "truth" and reestablished public
confidence in the law.241 According to Hegarty, the British government
used these inquiries "not as a tool to find truth and establish accountability
for human rights242violations, but as a way of deflecting criticism and
avoiding blame.,

Against this uninspiring historical backdrop, three public inquiries into
allegations of state violence have recently been convened in Northern
Ireland. The Hamill, Nelson, and Wright inquiries each deal with the
issue of collusion between paramilitary organizations and agents of the
state.243 These inquiries arose in response to reports issued in 2004 by
Canadian judge Peter Cory, which found that sufficient evidence of collusion
Eg
existed in these cases to warrant further investigations. 244
Cory's
investigations, in turn, stemmed from formal talks (the so-called Weston
Park negotiations) between the British government and Northern Ireland's
leading republican political party, Sinn Fein, in 2001, durin which an
agreement was reached to investigate allegations of collusion.
The Hamill, Nelson, and Wright inquiries, as well as the investigations
carried out by Judge Cory, are linked to the controversy over the murder
of Patrick Finucane. In 2003, shortly before the European Court's
interrogations; and the Parker Inquiry, which examined interrogation procedures for
terrorist suspects. Id.
240. See id. These were the Widgery Tribunal relating to Bloody Sunday and the
Scarman Inquiry into the practices of Northern Ireland's unionist government and the
reasons for the civil disturbances of 1969. Id.
241. Id. at 1149.
242. Id.at 1159.
243. Robert Hamill, a Catholic youth, was beaten to death by a loyalist gang in
1997, allegedly within sight of an RUC patrol that failed to intervene. See Robert Hamill
Inquiry, http://www.roberthamillinquiry.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2007). Rosemary Nelson, a
human rights lawyer, was killed when a bomb attached to her car exploded in 1999.
Prior to the murder she had been the recipient of threats and abuse from RUC officers.
See Rosemary Nelson Inquiry, http://www.rosemarynelsoninquiry.org_(last visited Dec. 1,
2007). Billy Wright, jailed leader of the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) paramilitary organization,
was murdered by republican fellow-prisoners under suspicious circumstances in 1997. See
Billy Wright Inquiry, http://www. billywrightinquiry.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
244. CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT: ROBERT HAMILL, 2004, H.C. 471,
http://www.nio.gov.uk/corycollusion inquiryreport (without appendices)_robert ha
mill.pdf; CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT: ROSEMARY NELSON, 2004, H.C. 473,
http://www.nio.gov.uk/corycollusion inquiryreport (without appendices)_rosemary_
nelson.pdf; CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT: BILLY WRIGHT, 2004, H.C. 472,
http://www.nio.gov.uk/corycollusioninquiryreport_(without appendices)_billy wright.pdf.
245. See infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.

decision in Finucane,a British government inquiry under the leadership
of Sir John Stevens, the senior British police officer who chaired earlier
investigations into allegations of collusion, recommended further
investigation into Finucane's death.246 The Third Stevens Inquiry concluded
that there was ample evidence of security force collusion in the murders
of Finucane and others, and asserted that as a result of this collusion
"innocent people were murdered or seriously injured., 247 Similarly,
Judge Cory recommended a public inquiry into Finucane's murder in his
2004 reports.248
In September 2004, in response to the Cory Reports, British Secretary
of State Paul Murphy announced the government's intent to conduct a
public inquiry into Finucane's death. However, Murphy stipulated that,
owing to "public interest, including the requirements of national
security," the proposed Finucane Inquiry would operate "on the basis of
new legislation."' 49 This new legislation took the form of the Inquiries
Act 2005,250 which was greeted by a storm of criticism. Opponents of
the Inquiries Act argue that it undermines the effectiveness of public
inquiries by allowing the British government to set their terms of
reference and limit public access to inquiry findings-even by going so
far as to prohibit the publication of certain information on the basis of
"public interest." 251 Judge Cory has publicly recommended that members
of the Canadian judiciary refrain from participating in inquiries
organized under the Act.2 52 The Finucane family has steadfastly refused
to take part in an inquiry held under the Inquiries Act and has continually
demanded the establishment of a fully independent, international investigation
into the matter.2 53
246.

SIR JOHN STEVENS, STEVENS ENQUIRY: OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

Apr. 17, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/northern_ireland/03/stephens inquiry/
pdf/stephensinquiry.pdf.
247. See Stevens Statement: Key Extracts, BBC NEWS, Apr. 17, 2003, http:l/
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northem ireland/2956557.stm.
248. CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT: PATRICK FINUCANE, 2004, H.C. 470, at
107, http://www.nio.gov.uk/corycollusin--inquiryrepor_(with-appendices)__patFinucane.pdf.
249. See O'BRIEN, supra note 42, at 166-67 (reproducing the Secretary of State's
statement on the proposed Finucane Inquiry in its entirety).
250. Inquiries Act, 2005, c. 12 (Eng.), availableat http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts
2005/20050012.htm.
251. See Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, The Inquiries Bill: A Briefing
from the NorthernIrelandHuman Rights Commission, Jan. 2005, http://www.nihrc.org/dms/
data/NIHRC/attachments/dd/files/65/147.doc; British-Iish Rights Watch, The Inquiries
Bill: An Endto PublicInquiries,Nov. 29, 2004, http://www.birw.org/Public%20lnquiries.html.
252. Letter from Hon. Peter Cory, Former Justice Supreme Court Can., to Chris
Smith, Chairman H. Comm. On Int'l Relations (Mar. 15, 2005), available at http://www.
birw.org/Letter/o20from% 20Judge%2OCory.html.
253. See Pat Finucane Centre, http://www.serve.com/pfc/#murderpf (last visited Dec. 1,
2007) (providing links to documents supporting the Finucane family's call for an
independent international inquiry into Finucane's death).
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Despite the controversy caused by the Inquiries Act, the British
government initially "converted" both the Wright and Hamill inquiries
to the new legislation.25 4 These conversions were widely viewed as a
"test run" in order to put pressure on the Finucane family to relent and
allow for an inquiry to take place under the Inquiries Act.255 In the
process, however, the government may have jeopardized the effectiveness
of both the Wright and Hamill inquiries and delayed the start of a new
investigation into Finucane's death. With the assistance of Amnesty
International, British-Irish Rights Watch, and the Committee on the
Administration of Justice, Billy Wright's father initiated a successful
legal challenge to the government's conversion of his son's inquiry to
the Inquiries Act 2005 on the grounds that such an inquiry would not
comply with Article 2 of the European Convention."
The Hamill
Inquiry, however, is still proceeding on the basis of the Inquiries Act.
The government's use of inquiries following the Jordan et al. decisions
seems to confirm Hegarty's suspicion that self-interest, rather than a
desire to investigate human rights abuses, is propelling government action.
In cases concerning collusion between state agents and paramilitary
groups, the government's reluctance to allow for an inquiry that meets
the effective official investigation standard is not surprising. Arguably,
the European Court's decisions in Shanaghan and Finucane have
opened up a wide number of deaths to potential investigation, thereby
expanding the effective reach of Article 2. Confirmed evidence of collusion
would undoubtedly be damaging to the British state. Nonetheless, the
failure to investigate these matters-especially the death of Finucane,
254. See Jane Winter, British-Irish Rights Watch, Director'sReport, Nov. 30, 2005,
http://www.birw.org/report%202005/Nov%2005.html [hereinafter BIRW November
2005 Director's Report] (noting that the Wright Inquiry was converted despite the
opposition of Billy Wright's family, their lawyers, and concerned non-governmental
organizations); Jane Winter, British-Irish Rights Watch, Director's Report, Mar. 31,
2006, http://www.birw.org/Report%202006/Mar%2006.html [hereinafter BIRW March
2006 Director's Report] (noting the conversion of the Hamill Inquiry).
255. See, e.g., BIRW March 2006 Directors Report, supra note 254 (suggesting that
a primary motive behind the conversion of the Hamill Inquiry was to "undermine the
opposition of Patrick Finucane's family to an Inquiries Act Inquiry").
256. See Jane Winter, British-Irish Rights Watch, Director'sReport, May 2, 2006,
http://www.birw.org/Report%202006/April%2006.html ("Amnesty International, British
-Irish Rights Watch and the Committee on the Administration of Justice have made a
third party intervention in the case brought by Bill Wright's father, David Wright ....
All four organizations are supporting David Wright's claim that the Inquiries Act is not
compatible with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights ... because it
cannot deliver an effective, independent investigation .... ").

whose murder was directly considered by the European Court-will
have detrimental legal and political ramifications in Northern Ireland.
With no public inquiry forthcoming, Finucane's death remains a point of
contention.257
C. "On-the-Runs" Legislation and the Question ofAmnesty
Should members of the security forces face accountability for their use
of lethal force? From a human rights perspective, especially in light of
the Jordan et al. decisions, the answer to this question is yes. Yet within
the political confines of Northern Ireland, whether and to what extent to
enforce accountability remains a significant question. Recently proposed
and quickly withdrawn British legislation aimed at dealing with "on-theruns" (i.e. members of paramilitary groups wanted in connection with
past violence) raised the issue of amnesty, or some variant thereof, for
certain members of the police and military. 8 Crucially, the proposed
legislation drew attention to the fact that past state violence cannot be
divorced from the paramilitary violence that gripped Northern Ireland
for decades.
In July 2001, the parties to the Good Friday Agreement-the governments
of Britain and the Republic of Ireland, as well as the majority of
Northern Ireland's political parties-met to discuss outstanding issues
related to the peace process. 9 Among the issues was the question of
how to deal with "on-the-runs"-republicans being sought by the British
state for offenses. Under the Good Friday Agreement and subsequent
legislation, the majority of paramilitary prisoners in both the United
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland became eligible for "early release"
provided that the organizations to which they belonged maintained
"complete and unequivocal" ceasefires. 260 This raised the question of
how the peace process should deal with members of paramilitary groups
(most importantly, members of the IRA) who believed they were being
sought for an offense, escaped from prison following conviction, absconded
while on bail prior to conviction, or were awaiting extradition. 261 The
Good Friday Agreement and subsequent prisoner release legislation failed
to address these situations. The Weston Park Proposals that emerged
from the July 2001 talks stated that "it would be a natural development
257. See Kevin Connolly, Stevens Inquiry Exposes NI Divisions, BBC NEWS, Apr.
17, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northernireland/2957445.stm.
258. Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill, 2005, Bill [54/1] (U.K.), available at
http://www.nio.gov.uk/northern-ireland- offences-bill.pdf [hereinafter Offences Bill
2005] (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (withdrawn on January 10, 2006).
259. See Bell, supra note 52, at 1130-32.
260. Good Friday Agreement, supranote 16, § 10.
261. Bell, supra note 52, at 1131-32.
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of the [prisoner release] scheme for prosecutions not to be pursued and
... as soon as possible, and in any event before the end of the year, [the
British and Irish governments will] take such steps as are necessary in
their jurisdictions262to resolve this difficulty so that those concerned are no
longer pursued.,

A response finally arrived in late 2005 in the form of the Northern
Ireland (Offences) Bill.263 The Offences Bill envisioned a process by
which both "on-the-runs" and, critically, certain members of the security
forces suspected of involvement in lethal force deaths would face
criminal convictions before a special tribunal. However, they would not
be required to attend hearings before the tribunal and would be freed on
license without serving prison sentences if convicted. 264 The bill was
roundly criticized by all of Northern Ireland's political parties. Its
inclusion of state forces in the scheme provoked particularly harsh
reactions. For example, Sinn Fein rejected the bill as amounting to an
"amnesty" for agents of the state who should face prison sentences for
their crimes.265 At the other end of the political spectrum, the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP), the province's largest unionist party and a
stalwart opponent of the Good Friday Agreement, argued that the
Offences Bill unfairly placed the actions of state agents in defending law
and order on the same level as those of terrorists bent on murder and
destruction. 266 British-Irish Rights Watch, for its part, reluctantly accepted
the "on-the-runs" portion of the legislation as a necessary political evil
insofar as it grew out of the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement,
but condemned the inclusion of state agents on the grounds that this
component of the legislation was not part of the Good Friday Agreement,
and furthermore contravened basic human rights principles.26 7
In the face of criticism from virtually all shades of political opinion in
Northern Ireland, the British government withdrew the Offences Bill in

262. John Reid & Brian Cowen, Weston Park Proposals 1 20 (Aug. 1, 2001),
http://www.nio.gov.uk/westonpark_document.pdf.
263. Offences Bill 2005, supranote 258.
264. Id.
265.
REUTERS,

266.

See Katherine Baldwin, Britain Scraps Amnesty Plan for N. Irish Fugitives,

Jan. 11, 2006.
See id.

267. See BIRW November 2005 Director's Report, supra note 254 ("We consider
that members of the security forces ... are public servants.... Higher standards can be
expected from public servants than those that can be hoped for from terrorists.").

January 2006.268 The withdrawal of the bill leaves open the question of
how the government will ultimately honor its Weston Park commitments
to deal with "on-the-runs" in a manner consistent with the early release
provisions of the Good Friday Agreement. It also remains to be seen
whether and to what extent state forces will be included in any amnestytype initiative aimed at dealing with past political violence. The reasoning
offered by British-Irish Rights Watch for accepting special legislation
for "on-the-runs" but rejecting it for state agents is logical up to a point,
but it denies the political reality of a situation in which both state and
non-state actors must be held accountable for their actions in a manner
consistent with the imperatives of the peace process.
The Jordan et al. decisions seem to rule out the possibility that any
form of amnesty for state agents would be compliant with relevant
principles of human rights law-these decisions require that thorough
investigations are carried out with an eye towards establishing criminal
accountability where warranted. However, a potential discrepancy arises
in areas where state and non-state violence overlap, such as with
allegations of collusion. Here, the Shanaghan and Finucane decisions
imply that certain acts of violence carried out by non-state actors (i.e.
paramilitary organizations) are subject to the same standards of an
effective official investigation under Article 2 as are incidents of state
violence. 269 This raises the question of whether legislation such as the
Offences Bill would be human rights compliant regardless of the parties
it is intended to cover.
Thus, although the actual "on-the-runs" legislation would have applied
to a very small number of state and non-state actors, the accountability
issues it raises have broader ramifications for the peace process. Such
issues demonstrate that accountability for state violence is merely one
piece in the larger puzzle of Northern Ireland's past. Impliedly, a more
broad-ranging and comprehensive legal approach to past violence might
be required in order to satisfy competing demands for truth and justice,
amnesty and accountability.
VI. EVALUATING THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
The European Court has recognized that the deaths at issue in Jordan
et al. "cr[y] out for an explanation., 270 This statement accurately implies
that the Jordan et al. incidents have legal, political, and social relevance
268. See Government Scraps Fugitive Plans, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11, 2006, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/l/hi/northem ireland/4602314.stm.
269. Shanaghan, supra note 13; Finucane, supra note 15.
270. Jordan, supra note 13,
124; Kelly and Others, supra note 13,
118;
Shanaghan, supra note 13, 108.
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in Northern Ireland that extends beyond the individual cases at issue.
Providing an explanation for how and why these deaths occurred, and
seeking to hold accountable those responsible for the illegal use of lethal
force, is critical within the context of Northern Ireland's ongoing peace
process.
The Jordan et al. decisions offer a blueprint for the way in which
lethal force deaths may be prevented in the future, as well as for the way
in which past incidents may be dealt with in the present. By clarifying
and strengthening the procedural component of the right to life, the
decisions make a positive contribution to the search for peace in
Northern Ireland by applying international human rights norms to the
abuses that occurred during the Troubles.
Six years after the first of these decisions was handed down, an analysis
of the United Kingdom's response to Jordan et al. raises important
questions concerning the current state of protection of the right to life in
Northern Ireland. On the one hand, the institutional reforms initiated by
the British government represent important steps towards ensuring that
similar violations of Article 2 do not occur in the future. The Committee
of Ministers, in its June 2006 pronouncement on the cases, recognized
that the British government has improved existing procedures and added
important new safeguards for dealing with lethal force deaths. 27
On the other hand, meeting the requirements of the Jordan et al.
decisions requires more than simply establishing additional procedural
safeguards for future cases. When the United Kingdom's responses to
the European Court's rulings are viewed from the vantage point of past
incidents of state violence, their utility is far less clear. Domestic right
to life jurisprudence, especially in light of the House of Lords' rulings in
In Re McKerr and the recent Jordan and McCaughey appeals, has had
the effect of prohibiting the application of Article 2's procedural
component to the vast majority of lethal force incidents that emerged
from the conflict in Northern Ireland. It is telling that the House of
Lords decisions most protective of the right to life as described by the
European Court-Middleton, Sacker, and Amin-relate to individual
death-in-custody incidents that occurred in England.27 2 When the
incidents at issue relate to state violence in Northern Ireland, as was the
case in In Re McKerr, the Jordan and McCaughey appeals, and Widgery
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Soldiers, the Lords have failed to interpret the right to life in a manner
consistent with international human rights law as established in Jordan
et al.273 As Bell and Keenan note, "[b]oth the House of Lords and the
lower courts in Northern Ireland acknowledge[] in small ways that
'something different is going on' in the Northern Ireland cases. However,
this recognition of 'something different' is used by the courts as an
excuse to 'back off a robust bringing back home of Article 2's
procedural requirement., 274 The result of this domestic jurisprudenceas well as of domestic legislation such as the Inquiries Act 2005, which
has stalled attempts to establish an inquiry into the death of Patrick
Finucane-is that the United Kingdom has yet to fulfill its "continuing
obligation" to initiate Article 2-compliant investigations into the
incidents at issue in Jordan et al., a fact which the Committee of
Ministers recognized even as it praised the United Kingdom's futureoriented institutional reforms. 75
In light of this discrepancy between future-oriented and backwardlooking applications of the right to life, it is worth considering why the
United Kingdom has been generally reluctant to apply Article 2 to state
violence in Northern Ireland. At least part of the answer lies in the
complex and unique political transition currently taking place in
Northern Ireland. As a number of observers have pointed out, Northern
Ireland's peace process is not paradigmatic of similar transitions that
have taken place in other parts of the world.276 The wave of democratizations
that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s in Africa, Latin America, and
Eastern Europe were, on the whole, precipitated by decisive, farreaching political and social transformations. This normally included
the ouster of the previous regime under which human rights abuses
occurred and the establishment of a new political order that placed the
protection of human rights at its core.
By contrast, the British state responsible for human rights violations
during the Troubles remains in power, presiding over Northern Ireland's
transition. This fact constrains the choices available for dealing with the
past, especially insofar as those choices would involve shedding light on
some of the more sinister aspects of Britain's role in Northern Ireland,
such as the illegal use of deadly force by its soldiers or cooperation
between the security forces and loyalist paramilitary death squads. A
robust application of Article 2 to the issue of state violence during the
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Troubles would potentially have serious ramifications for the British
government.
Nonetheless, although important, Britain's role in Northern Ireland's
transition remains only one piece of a far more complex puzzle.
Although the British government appears, in many respects, to be acting
out of self-interest when it moves to prevent a robust application of
Article 2, it might also be attempting to act in the best interests of the
Northern Ireland peace process. The issue of state violence is an extremely
sensitive one, and it polarizes Northern Ireland's two communities. Bell
and Keenan have identified two dynamics at work in Northern Ireland's
peace process: a vertical dynamic comprising the relationships between
individuals and the state and a horizontal dynamic concerned with the
relationship between unionists and nationalists.2 77 When the United
Kingdom blocks Article 2-compliant investigations into lethal force
deaths, it is arguably jeopardizing the vertical dynamic. Yet at the same
time, Britain might argue that it is attempting to strengthen the horizontal
dynamic. The government's ability to engage fully with Northern
Ireland's past is limited by the strain such an engagement would place
on unionist/nationalist relations and, by extension, the peace process.
Further, the Good Friday Agreement, arguably by design, leaves open
the issue of how to deal with past violence, and instead focuses on the
creation of a political framework for compromise and power-sharing.278
Although this is a reasonable political solution in many respects, at some
level Northern Ireland will have to come to terms with its past in order to
ensure future political cooperation. 279 Given this, it is important to
remember that in Northern Ireland state violence cannot be divorced
from political violence as a whole.
Once again, the McKerr incident serves as a prism through which to
consider violence and accountability. It is worth remembering that two
of the victims at Tullygally Road were suspected of having planted a
bomb that resulted in the deaths of three members of the RUC shortly
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before they themselves were killed. While this does not provide an
excuse for the actions of the HMSU in shooting the IRA members at the
roadblock, it does point to the intimate connection between violence
perpetrated by non-state actors and violence perpetrated by the state over
the course of the conflict. Similarly, the fate of Lord Justice Gibson, the
jurist whose exoneration and commendation of the HMSU caused such
controversy in the wake of the incident, highlights this intimate connection.
Three years after rendering his decision, Gibson and his wife were killed
by the IRA in a carefully planned landmine attack as they crossed the
border into Northern Ireland on their way home from a holiday in the
Republic. 28° Non-state violence must also be dealt with as part of the
overall process of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. To
ensure the full application of Article 2, the British state must take a more
holistic approach to Northern Ireland's past.
VII. CONCLUSION
On March 26, 2007, Northern Ireland's largest political parties and
bitterest enemies, the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein, announced
plans to revive the power-sharing government envisioned by the Good
Friday Agreement that had laid dormant since 2002.281 This decision
has revived hopes that the worst years of the Northern Ireland conflict
are over and that political compromise rather than violent conflict will
characterize the province's political landscape in the future.
In order to fully realize the promise of this historic step, the United
Kingdom must work to ensure that the violence of the Troubles is dealt
with in a manner that is compatible both with international human rights
law and the imperatives of the peace process. For the families of the
victims of the Jordan et al. incidents, and for all other victims of
violence throughout Northern Ireland, a full explanation of the reasons
for their suffering has been too long delayed. The European Court's
Article 2 jurisprudence provides an important and useful roadmap for
reaching a true "final court of justice." The challenge for the British
government lies in meeting these decisions head-on. To the extent the
United Kingdom seeks to minimize or escape responsibility for past
human rights violations, it will inevitably meet them again in the form of
continued political strife in Northern Ireland, as the ghosts of the past
"linger at the margins of political debate and legal process, stymieing the
capacity of all such systems to move forward., 282 By contrast, dealing
280. See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 250.
281. See Eamon Quinn & Alan Cowell, Ulster Factions Agree to a Plan for Joint
Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at Al.
282. Ni Aoliin, supra note 81, at 590.
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with the decisions in a manner consistent with human rights law and the
imperatives of Northern Ireland's peace process will strengthen prospects
for a just and lasting peace.
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